For the remainder of the inter-war peri?od Australia’s matchwinners with the ball were spinners, in the main Clarrie Grimmett, Bill O’Reilly and ‘Dainty�?Ironmonger with help from Arthur Mailey and ‘Chuck�?Fleetwood-Smith. The Australian pace attack was not quite the ‘gesture to convention�?that India used in the 1960s and 1970s, but fast bowli?ng was not the way they expected to win Test matches.

By the time England visited in 1924/25 McDonald wa??s gone, playing professionally in the Lancashire League whilst waiting to acquire the residential qualifica??tion that enabled the Red Rose, for the only time, to dominate county cricket in the late 1920s. Gregory was still around, and played in all five Tests taking 22 wickets, but the cost was 37.09, and he wasn’t quite the bowler he had been four years previously.

In 1924/25 Gregory did have a pace bowler to open with, although Charlie Kelleway was no more than fast medium. In fact Kelleway bettered Gregory in the averages, albeit he took only 14 wickets, but the cost of those was a creditable 29.50 each. He proved rather more economical than his more illustrious partners but he was no youngster, and despite his bowling being described as lively and animated he was already 38. Kelleway ?had made a Test debut back in 1910. He was a good enough batsman to end with an average of 37.42 and, when his Test career finally ended, four years later after a solitary wicketless Test in the 1928/29 Ashes, he had a tally of 52 wickets in his 26 Tests for which he had paid 32.36, so a genuine all-rou??nder if never a prolific wicket taker.

The only other Australians to provide a measure of pace bowling in 1924/25 were batsmen Jack Ryder and ‘Stork�?H?endry. Both were on the quicker side of medi?um pace, and it would be unfair to describe either as only occasional bowlers, but equally neither could claim to be a true all-rounder at Test level. 

Australia won 4-1 in 1924/25 and Mailey had a big bag of wickets and Grimmett first appeared late in the series??. In 1926 England had gr?own stronger and, in a famous match at the Oval, finally won back the Ashes by winning the fifth and final Test. There was some poor weather but the fact that in five Tests the Australian seamers took only four wickets between them is still remarkable. Gregory took three of those, at a cost of 99.33 runs each, and Ryder paid 142 runs for his wicket. The only other pace bowler in the party, 25 year old Sam Everett, did not get in the Test side at all.

In 1928/29 Percy Chapman’s England returned from Australian with a 4-1 Ashes triumph. In the first Test the Australian selectors reprised their opening attack of four years previously with Gregory and Kelleway. Neither played again. As noted the 42 year old Kelleway had gone wicketless and Gregory, who had at least taken three wickets, suffered a career ending knee injury in an attempt to take a catch from his own bowling from young English fast bowler Harold Larwood. Australia lost that match and the next three, an increasingly desperate selection policy entrusting the seam attack at various times to Hendry and Ryder, as well as Otto Nothling, Ted, a’Beckett, Alan Fairfax and Ron Oxenham, none of whom thre?atened any fireworks.

Australia’s consolation victory came in the fifth and final Test and, in large part, came courtesy of the efforts of a young fast bowler, Tim Wall, selected at 24 for his debut. Wall was not genuinely fast, but had a ??long run and a good action which, combined with his height, could make him a handful. In this match, which went into an eighth day, he took 3-123 and 5-66, looking particularly impressive for a time in the England second innings when rain briefly freshened the wicket.

When Australia reclaimed the Ashes in 1930 the best remembered ??contribution was the 974 runs scored by Donald Bradman, but the 29 wickets Grimmett took were vital as well. Wall was consistent, but lacked penetration and as far as the averages we??re concerned Australia’s most successful seam bowlers in the Tests were two medium pacers, Alan Fairfax and Stan McCabe.

The following summer West Indies visited Australia for the first time and a year later the South Africans. Australia’s margins of victory were 4-1 and 5-0, so they were not extended and the bowlers who did almost all the damage were Ironmonger and Grimmett. Wall went wicketless in his only appearance against West Indies, but did rather better against the South Africans. The only seamer to make any sort of mark against the men from the Caribbean was Alec Hurwood who, in the first two Tests, took 11 wickets at 15.45 before his employers declined to allow him to make h??imself available for the rest of the series. As a medium pacer Hurwood would not, however, have been the answer to Australia’s lack of pace in any event.

Much of the blame for the lack of Australian pace bowlers is put on the pitches and playing conditions in Australia at the time. Wickets were hard and true and Test matches were timeless. The only time bowlers could look forward to an advantage was on the notorious sticky wickets of the era, and when those conditions were encountered it was almost always the slower men who got to take advantage. That said ??visiting teams pace bowlers had their moments. Maurice Tate had a wonderful se?ries for England in 1924/25 and he had some success four years later as well, as did Larwood and Leicestershire’s George Geary. 

The West Indies bowlers were, overall, disappointing, but their attack was dominated by pace, all of George Francis, Herman Griffith and Learie Constantine bowling well at times. For the South Africans paceman Sandy Bell, despite that 5-0 hammering, emerged with the excellent return of 23 wickets at 27.13 even though Australia won three of the Tests by an innings and another by ten wickets. There wa??s also success for pace bowlers in Australia in 1932/33. There are still those who cry foul where the success of Larwood and Bill Voce in that ‘Bodyline�?summer is concerned. The rights and wrongs of Jardinian leg theory cannot alter one thing however, and that is the 21 wickets at 28.13 that Gubby Allen took, bowling strictly conventional off theory.

The Australian selectors chose to fight Bodyline with spin and Wall, despite much off field clamouring for some selections to fight fire with fire. There is no doubt that there were some candidates, but skipper Bill Woodfull was not prepared to retaliate. The native Australian Eddie Gilbert for one was fit and firing and, in Bradman’s view, the fastest man he ever faced. But Gilbert had a much maligned action and never did play Test cricket. Also in the frame was the Australian Rules Footballer Laurie N??ash, another who was fast and nasty and who doubtless because of that did not appeal to Woodfull. Last but not least was the man who did replace Wall in the side for the final Test, Harry ‘Bull�?Alexander.  Genuinely quick but not very accurate Alexander?? took only one wicket, although by hitting Douglas Jardine more than once at least pleased the crowd if not his captain. Alexander never played for Australia again.

As in 1930 a Bradman inspired Australia won back the Ashes in England in 1934, though once more pace bowling did not make a major contribution. Between ??them O’Reilly and Grimmett took 53 wickets and, with six at 78.66 Wall led the pace bowlers. McCabe took just four wickets and the only other specialist seamer in the Australian side, Hans Ebeling, who took Wall’s place in the final Test, took three in what proved to be his only Test.

1934 was the end of the road for Wall, who announced his retirement, so the search began again. In Victoria there was Ernie McCormick, a bowler of real pace who had appeared against Tasmania in 1929, although it would be two years before he first played a Sheffield Shield fixture. Part of the problem was a period o??ut of the game after an appendectomy, another was that there were not sufficient places in the Victorian line up to accommodate McCormick, Nash and Alexander.

A keen baseball player McCormick realised he needed to add something to his game in order to be certain of his place and in December of 1933 it was reported in The Australian Cricketer that he had developed the baseball art of swerve and incorporated that in to his bowling with such success that he now had six different type of delivery; fast and slow outswingers, a fast inswinger, a backspinner that kicked, a straight ball and an off break. The?? article concerned went on to explain that he had also cut his run up from 18 paces to 12 and had started to deliver the ball with a full body swing, rather than the square on approach he had begun his career with.

Another aspect of McCormick’s game, unusual for a tall fast bowler, was that he was a fine slip catcher and it was that, as much as his bowling that led to The Australian Cricketer calling for McCormick’s inclusion in the 1934 touring? part through the early months of the year. Sadly for McCormick and his supporters however his one chance in 1934 to impress the selectors, a Shield game against New South Wales at the end of January, saw him record the disappointing analysis of 34-1-148-1.

The next Test series for Australia was their trip in 1935/36 to South Africa. The two countries had met in South Africa before, but only as an afterthought following a long Australian tour of England, so this five Test series was eagerly awaited. There was much disappointment when ill health prevented Bradman making the trip, but the party was still a strong one and the fast bowler who made the party was McCormick.  The spin attack of O’Reilly and Grimmett were the driving force behind Australia’s 4-0 victory, but with 15 wickets  at 27.86 McCormick’s first taste of international cricket was a successful one. As a tourist he was immensely popular, teammate Len Darling describing him as the funniest man I ever toured with, and the type that every team should have on a long trip.

Selected for the first Test of the 1936/37 Ashes series McCormick provided a sensational start. For the very first delivery of the rubber he produced a very rapid bumper which the Derbyshire opener Stan Worthington attempted to hook to the fence, but succeeded only in popping up for ‘keeper Bert Oldfield to help him become only the second bowler, and the last before Shane Warne, to take a wicket with his ??first delivery in Ashes cricket.

Batting at first drop for England was Arthu??r Fagg, who was quickly struck a painful blow about the body and then came very close to being hit on the head. It came as no surprise when, in trying to glance McCormick, he was dismissed for four. What was more surprising was the next delivery, the great English champion Walter Hammond doing no more tha??n popping up a straightforward chance to one of McCormick’s two short legs.

??Had Australia not then missed a couple of chances in the field (McCormick himself was responsible for the first, and he was the unfortunate bowler for the second) then England might not have been able to score the 358 that, after being 20-3, they recovered to.  For McCormick there was time for just eight overs before an attack of lumbago prevente??d him bowling again in a match which, thanks to the intervention of the weather, England went on to win contrary to the form book and all expectations.

The lumbago had cleared up before the second Test, or at least it had for the first session when McCormick again bowled at great speed. Neville Cardus however felt he wasted his opportunity by bowling too many deliveries on a leg stump line and then, after lunch, Cardus complained of McCormick’s bowling becoming laboured and middle aged. That McCormick’s pace would drop significantly after his opening burst was an observation made by many.  Thanks to a double century from Hammond England were able to ?declare on 426-6 and, fortunate again with the weather, they went on to win by an innings.

For the third Test at the MCG McCormick was sidelined by his lumbago, but there was no like for like replacement as the left arm wrist spin of Fleetwood-Smith replaced him. This time the Australian attack was opened by McCormick’s opening partner of the first two Tests, fellow Victorian Morris Sievers, and McCabe??. Sievers was another tall man, but not much above medium pace. In this game however he had? the good fortune to get the ball in his hands, in tandem with O’Reilly, when the weather chose this time to visit its wrath on England and he took 5-21 as they were dismissed for 76 in their first innings. Strangely this was to prove the end of Sievers�?three Test career as a fit again McCormick took his place for the fourth Test.

Australia, thanks in large measure to Bradman, completed the comeback by winning the final two Tests. There were two wickets in each innings for McCormick in the fourth match at Adelaide and then, in a move which surprised many, a second bowler of re?al pace was selected for the decider, like the third Test played at the MCG. Fellow Victorian Nash was the man picked and England skipper Allen was sufficiently concerned to make it clear to Bradman that he would not tolerate any intimidatory bowling by the Australians. His worries proved unfounded on that score, although bowling a conventional line Nash did take 4-70 in the English first innings and another in the second. For McCormick there were no first innings wickets, but he snared Worthington and Les Ames in the second.

Af??ter the series finished there was one final round of Sheffield Shield matches left, and for Victoria that meant a trip to Adelaide to play South Australia. Batting second the Victorians took a first innings lead of 31 at which point McCormick embarked on a sensational spell of bowling as he took 9-40 in eleven overs to leave the South Australian innings in tatters at 75-9. With victory all but certain and a rare chance of an ‘all ten�?for a pace bowler on offer Victoria’s skipper, Ebeling, tried to help. He had bowled eight overs himself, before bringing Fleetwood-Smith on. After two overs of Fleetwood-Smith Ebeling, concerned his unorthodox spinner might well inadvertently take a wicket, brought on Sievers with strict instructions to bowl wide and with the fielders all knowing that any opportunities had to go to ground. Inexplicably in the circumstances Sievers bowled Graham Williams with his sixth delivery �?it is unlikely that Sievers was bearing a grudge after his omission from the fourth Test, and rather more likely that he thought it would appeal to McCormick’s sense of fun. In any event it was the only time in his career that McCormick took more than six in an innings and, having taken 3-56 in the first, the only time he had a ten w?icket match haul.

McCormick came to England in 1938. The prospect of a genuine fast bowle??r performing for Australia for the first time since 1921 aroused much interest, a good deal of which was dashed in McCormick’s first appearance in the country. In the traditional tour opener at Worcester Australia batted first and (Bradman 258) spent the first day and an hour of the second putting together a total of 541. McCormick took the new ball. His first over consisted of 14 deliveries, and from one of the legal deliveries opening batsman Charles Bull, attempting a hook, deflected the ball on to his head and had to retire hurt. The second over comprised another 15 deliveries.

At this point Bradman spoke to the umpire and asked if McCormick was dragging. Dragging? He’s jumping two feet over was the response, and after an eight delivery third over McCormick was removed from the attack. He came back and was certainly better, but still managed a total of 35 no balls in 20 overs. The explanation given was that McCormick, who by now had a thirty yard run had not, in practice at Lord’s, been able to utilise his full run hence th?e Worcester game being his first opportunity to do so.

The first Test at Trent Bridge? was drawn with England batting first and piling up 658-8 before Hammond declared. Australia had some awkward moments before a majestic innings from McCabe ensured they would save the game. McCormick took 1-128 but had no luck, a catch going down in the gully in his first over and Len Hutton shortly after that contriving to play the ball on to his stumps without disturbing the bails. 

One record that McCormick will never lose was set up in the second Test at Lord’s when, after Hammond again won the toss and chose to bat, he became the first man to bowl a ball on live television. The delivery itself was uneventful, bu??t there was life in the wicket and England were reduced to 31-3 with McCormick having Hutton and Charles Barnett caught at short leg and, between those two, bowling Bill Edrich. Unfortunately for Australia Hammond then played an innings like that of McCabe at Trent Bridge, and again the match was drawn.

The third Test, at Old Trafford, was abandoned without a ball bowled because of rain, and ?then the ?Australians won at Headingley to go one up in the series.  McCormick dismissed Barnett in each innings, but that was his only success in what proved to be his final Test. 

To th??e surprise of many McCormick was left out of the final Test at the Oval, the management having concerns, given a recent bout of neuritis in his right shoulder, about his ability to last the course in a timeless Test. In the event Hammond won the toss and an anodyne Australian attack was bludgeoned by England (Hutton 364) until Hammond finally took pity on the visitors and declared at 903-7. With Bradman and Fingleton both unable to bat the eventual margin of England’s victory was an innings and 579 runs. Had a risk been taken with McCormick’s fitness it seems unlikely that the margin would have been that great. As it was the Australian opening attack was McCabe and the equally gentle medium pace of Mervyn Waite. If ever a cricket match was decided on the toss of a coin it was this one.

On his return to Australia after the tour of England McCormick played for one more season before, at the age of 32, retiring at the end of the 1938/39 season. Outside the game he was a skilled jeweller, sometimes nicknamed ‘Goldie�?and in time he was commissioned to make the Frank Worrell Trophy. It amused him no end that he later got the same job again, only to lose it when the West Indies Board found the original. The sense of humour never deserted Ernie McCormick, who would relate to all comers a story about his attendance at the centenary Test in 1977, when a spectator greeted him with the question, didn’t you used to be Ernie McCormick?

The California-based, Indian techie needed to do something to de-stress. The cricket bug that had b?itten him years ago ??came to his rescue and an inspiring idea was born.

“The mind needed a respite, to escape into another world, to my 12-yea??r-old self when life revolved around cricket and movies,�?begins Galagali in his deep baritone.

“I decided to unearth vintage footage of p??riceless moments from India’s rich cricketing history,�???he says, sitting in his Bangalore apartment while on a busman’s holiday.

Today, his non-profit YouTube channel ‘Jai Galagali�?features several old videos dating back to the 1940s sourced from India’s Films Division as well as self-created video??s relating to cricket.

His channel has over 30,000 subscribers and millions of viewers ac??ross cricket playing countries. Moreover, Galagali has come to be known as an archivist and history buff of Indian cricket, a fact recognised by well-known c??ricketers and media outlets.

However, his journey from 2017 was no cakewalk. Sitting in his study in California, he had to make numerous phone calls at night to the Films Division in Mumbai that often went unanswered. Galagali doggedly pursued his goal??, knocking many doors before finally getting his booty after paying for it. The shipment of 200 DVD’s (each DVD was a newsreel comprising cricket titbits too) landed at his doorstep.

“I carried that box which was literally holding the history of Indian cricket and when I took it to my room, te??ars welled up in my eyes?,�?he says half-smiling.

The newsreels comprised every cricket match filmed in India since 1948, a year after India’s independence in 1947. Some of them? had s?oundtracks, many didn’t, he adds.

Galagali swung into action fast, posting the videos on his YouTube channel with some editing. Gradually, he lent some depth to the videos with a brief narration by adding some context, background and inter??esting information. The libraries of Stanford University and University of California, Berkeley were useful repositories for his rese?arch.

The first video, recalls Galagali, was a three-minute?? one of the1973 India-England match at Kolkata and the latest video is an interview w??ith former Indian wicket-keeper Syed Kirmani, who released his autobiography recently in Bangalore.

Some of the popular videos include India’s first cricket test mat?ch victory in 1952 in Madras; the Indian players are seen wearing black wrist bands as a mark of respect to the departed King George VI. In that memorable video, Galagali also interviews C.D.Gopinath, now a nonagenarian, who took the winning catch of that match.

Another is of the first India-Pakistan test series in 1??952 where the legendary Subhash Gupte’s bowling action is brought live for the first time.

There are other memorable snippe?ts of cricket matches played in the 50s and 60s between India and England, India and the West Indies, the Pakistan tour of India and the debut matches of some of India’s finest cricketers.

Cricket matches have always seen some drama and one striking video is of an enthusiastic lady in a saree who beat the security and made it to the pi?tch to kiss Brijesh Patel on scoring 50 runs in the India-West Indies test match in Mumbai, 1975.

Unexpectedly, Galagali’s labour of love hit a snag in 2020 when he received an email from YouTube citing copyright violation from the ?government of India. Realising he was not in the wrong, especially having paid for the DVD’s, he made several pleas to the Films Div?ision that fell on deaf ears.

Galagali then reached out to cricket loving politician Shashi Tharoor who wrote a scathing letter to the ministry highlighting the significance of such a channel. Some cricketers too voiced their? opinion in favour of the channel. Soon, the channel resumed.

During the Covid lockdown, Galagali posted videos regularly, providing?? viewers, particularly cricket lovers an option when live matches ??were not telecast.

The response to Gala??gali’s YouTube channel is encouraging. “The footage brings so much of the warmth, nostalgia and joy of the many cricketing stories to so many viewers,�?he gushes and goes on to cite some respo??nses.

A teenager from Delhi called to thank Galagali because his grandfather, suffering from dementia, opened up, recollecting the past? after watching some videos.

India’s legendary captain Pataudi’s daughter sent a message saying the videos brought back a f?lood of memories of her dad.

A renowned economist wrote to say that his late sister while going through chemotherapy would endle??ssl?y watch as she spotted herself among the spectators in one of his videos.

It was ‘yesterday once more�?for a Sri Lankan cricketer, currently living in Australia after seeing a reel of the first test series between In??dia and Sri ?Lanka. The cricketer played in that series.

Galagali has thus far posted only about fifty percent of the valuable treasure in his possession. Th?ankfu??lly, with the family member now back in good health, viewers can expect many more videos of Indian cricket.

//jaigalagali.wordpress.com/

The spotlight on Joe Root’s record against Australia is a natural byproduct of an intense Ashes rivalry.? However, compared with the record of one of his fellow members of “The Big Four�?club ??????????????????????????in Kane Williamson, the one relative blemish on Root’s track record seems less stark than it might otherwise appear.

The current appraisal of Root comes as part of the year-long sabre-rattling ahead of another Anglo-Australian clash, beginning in November 2025. Former Australian left-hander Darren Lehmann and �?to no one’s surprise �?Ian Chappell, a man seldom short of a cricketing opinion, have weighed in on Root.  Lehmann has stated that Root should not be considered an all-time great since he has yet to make a Test ton in Australia and has even placed the Yorkshireman a rung below Williamson and Virat Kohli. Chapelli, meanwhile, is full of praise for the former England captain, saying �?em>Root was born to make runs.  He’s a joy to watch, as he balances a solid technique with the desire to core at every opportunity�?

Technically, though, Chappell has observed a flaw in the Root armoury which could account for his less flattering record on Australian pitches, arguing �?em>the more worrying statistic in Australia is the number of times he’s caught behind. Keepers have had a bonanza as ten times they’ve clasped Root’s edges in 27 innings. While he could counter with “you’ve got to be good enough to nick ‘em�? it does suggest he needs to re-assess the extra bounce Australian pitches provide.�? 

Lack of centuries aside, it is worth noting that Root has notched nine half-centu?ries against the Australians. Compared with Kane Williamson, Root’s overall record against the Aussies is superior �?40.46 as opposed to an avera??ge of 36.95 for the New Zealander.  Against India, Williamson’s record is considerably the inferior, with an average of 37.86 over 20 runs fewer than Root’s 58.03, while on a head-to-head against each other’s country Root has a mean of 54.06 as opposed to Williamson’s 39.62 against England.

Batting against South Africa, West Indi??es, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, the Kiwi has the statistical edge over the York??shireman. However, an average of 62.82 for Williamson against South Africa and 46.53 for the Englishman against the same opposition does not exactly embarrass Root. Neither do direct comparisons against Pakistan (66.04 and 49.34), Sri Lanka (74.02 and 62.54), and West Indies (60.62 versus 56.03).

Where Williamson has a definite edge is in his accumulation of two Test hundreds against the Australians. As for Ian Chappell’s thoughts on Root’s adaptability to Australian surfaces, the New Zealander, by contrast, is acknowledged as having a very specific approach, quite distinct from his peers. Eschewing an exaggerat?ed lunge in the forward push, Williamson’s initia?l movement is firm yet not as pronounced as his contemporaries. Equally key is the ability to play the ball late.

Ricky Ponting has observed that Williamson �?em>doesn’t make a big stride forward�?and that he �?em>plays the ball later than anyone�?  Former England captain Nasser Hussain, assessing Williamson’s technical prowess, noted the economy of movement, hand positioning and footwork that are the bedrock of his success. Advancing the theory of an imaginary “box�?Hussain noted �?em>imagine you’ve got a box round about your waist height and just below. If you get your hands outside that box you’re playing the ball early. If you can keep it in your box, you’re playing it late�?  

Hands positioned outside the imaginary “box�?would also, Hussain argued, increase the likelihood of following the ball outside the off stump and nicking a chance to ‘keeper and slips. Hussain was in little doubt that it is this compactness which has contributed to Kane Williamson’s success. Maybe a similar adjustment by Root on Australian wickets would pay dividends and give credence to Chappelli’s view that the England man needs to re-assess the bounce on those surfaces.

What will ultimately deliver that much sought after Ashes century for Joe Root is the method Ian Chappell so eulogised. It is a technique shaped by the modern age, but also one which begins from first principles and is a method which, at its core, is a product of the Yorkshire sod which produced some of the greatest batting technicians in the history of the game. When Neville Cardus described Sir Leonard Hutton as someone who played with a �?em>blueprint in his mind�?he could easily be ??describing Jo??e Root almost 70 years later.  

Stylistically Root’s Yorkshire cricketing lineage is apparent in everything from the light grip on the bat handle to the legs-apart stance at the crease, while the balance on the balls of the feet is redolent of Sir Geoffrey Boycott himself.  Alert, side-on, and able to transfer to the back and front foot with easy dexterity, Root displays a classicism that stretches back to Hutton and Sutcliffe, though to Boycott, Bill Athey, and now Harry Brook, a method which is so?? typical of his home county.    

Watching footage of Mike Gatting’s England in Australia on their victorious 1986/87 tour, the likeness between Athey and Root is startling. Sure enough, Root’s gifts are of a rarifi??ed nature in contrast with Athey’s narrower mode of operation, but the essential Yorkshire boilerplate of stance, footwork, and posi?tioning bears the stamp of the White Rose county.

Like Williamson Root’s busy nature at the crease and innovative strokeplay are indicative of a player who has grown up in a multi-format ?cricketing landscape. As such, the gasp-inducing classical strokes which were once so typical of Root’s English antecedents like Hammond, May, Cowdrey, Dexter, and Gower are perhaps not so evidently at the fore of his repertoire. Instead, tellingly, the Root audience will marvel at the deployment of the ramp and its reverse iteration, both strokes it is difficult to imagine his illustrious predecessors attempting, although the pioneering Dexter might well hav??e added such shots to his range.

Joe Root is England’s f??inest modern player and a titan of the current batting landscape. The disparity between his overall record and his figures against Australia are certainly tangible, although not, say, as marked as Ian Botham’s record against West Indies and his achievements against the rest.  If the Yorkshireman takes on board the observations of Ian Chappell next winter maybe his wait for a Test hundred against the old foe will come to an end. In the week that Root and fellow Yorkshireman Harry Brook sit atop the men’s ICC Test batting rankings, his followers will take heart that this modern batting great has still plenty left in the tank and, maybe, a bit to prove.

One name that always appealed to me was that of Rony Stanyforth. I did know that Stanyforth had captained England in South Africa in 1927/28 despite never having been a regular ?with his county, Yorkshire, but knew little more about him than that. That appeal arose out of a discussion with a fellow tragic as to just who was the least known England captain.

In truth I think that title has to go to Monty Bowden who, at the age of 23, led England against South Africa at Newlands in the second of the two Tests of 1888/89. A modest batsman and occasional wicketkeeper Bowden remained in South Africa at the end of the tour and was dead three years later, but unlike Stany??forth he is ?the subject of a biography, albeit not one that you see very often*.

But I doubt anyone would argue with the proposition that Stanyforth is England’s most obscure twentieth century captain, so I decided to look into his story. Given the relative paucity of First Class cricket that featured Stanyforth whilst I certainly uncovered an interesting story it ended up as nowhere near the 3,000 words in length that, for some reason that now escapes me, I had always regarded as the ideal length for a profile, so I shelved the idea and the story remained on my hard drive.

Then last year, without my having specifically intended to acquire it, a signed photograph of Stanyforth was part of a small cache of memorabilia that I acquired fr??om a UK book dealer. At that point I  discovered that Stanyforth’s signature is a rare item, so I decided that the time was right to go into the loft, retrieve and fire up my old laptop and give the Stanyforth story a quick buffing and share it with anyone intereste??d.

The first curious thing?? I discovered about Stanyforth was that, prior to his being appointed to lead England (or more accurately MCC) in South Africa he had in fact never played for Yorkshire. Moving forward from there his Yorkshire career turned out to be limited to three appearances in 1928, in consecutive matches in May and June. That looked odd, and the more so because, flying in the face of the tradition of which Yorkshireman are so proud, Stanyforth had been born outside the county, in London on 30 May 1892. So that Yorkshire debut came as late as his 36th birthday.

In time, 1941, Stanyforth did marry, but the marriage was not blessed with ch??ildren and the man christened Ronald Thomas Stanyforth was therefore the last of his line?. That in itself may account, at least in part, for why cricket writers have shown so little interest in him. 

In terms of his background Stanyforth’s was a privileged one and, hence his being regarded as a Yorkshireman?, the family seat was at Kirk Hammerton Hall near York. Stanyforth’s forebears had made a great deal of money in business and a part of it, sadly, seemingly from the slave trade.  

Stanyforth was the younger of two children**, but the only son, so he ultimately inherited the family fortune. He was educated at Eton and his interest in cricket and many other sports was fostered ??there. Always a wicketkeeper it is worth noting that whilst Stanyforth did play for the Eton’s first XI he was never selected for the matches against the other leading schools. The story was similar when he went up to Oxford, for whom he made his First Class debut against MCC in 1914. That occasion was however the only time he appeared for the University at that level.

After University Stanyforth had no need to work, but he chose to join the Army. With the Great War just weeks away and given the life expectancy of young officers S?tanyforth was fortunate to survive the conflict. He was wounded in 19?15, mentioned in dispatches in 1917 and awarded the Military Cross, so was clearly a brave man.

Remainin?g with the Army as peace returned Stanyforth found himself in Ireland during the period of martial law imposed in 1919 and 1920. After that the by now Captain Stanyforth did take up a more cong?enial position, that of equerry to the Duke of Gloucester, the third son of King George V.

His background in the military and with? the royal family doubtless afforded Stanyforth increased opportunities to play the game and he was involved also with the MCC. Through the early 1920s he played at First Class level for both the Army and the MCC and in the winter of 1926/27 he was able to leave his military duties to tour South America with a strong MCC side led by ‘Plum�?Warner, then 53. 

The all amateur side was a pretty good one, all involved having First Class experience and ‘Gubby�?Allen and Jack ‘Farmer�?White went on to enjoy successful Test careers. In those days the game in Argentina in particular was strong, and four matches against the national side were given First Class status. The series was a competitive one as well, but the MCC won 2-1 in the end. Warner rated Stanyforth as a ‘keeper, and wrote effusively of his skills in The Cricketer. Stanyforth ??also did well with the bat, being the highest MCC run scorer in the First Class matches and recording what would? remain his highest innings, 91, in the last and deciding match against Argentina.

South Africa, an established Test nation, were however a rather different proposition. Warner was doubtless the driving force behind the invitation issued to Stanyforth. The other amateurs who acce?pted invitations were Guy Jackson of De?rbyshire, Bob Wyatt of Warwickshire, Geoffrey Legge of Kent, Eddie Dawson of Leicestershire and the young Middlesex leg spinners Ian Peebles and Greville Stevens. Douglas Jardine was amongst those who was unable to accept an invitation.

As far as the professionals were concerned Jack Hobbs, Patsy Hendren, Frank Woolley, Harold Larwood and Maurice Tate all declined to make themselves available, but with Walter Hammond, Herbert Sutcliffe, ‘Tich�?Freeman, George Geary, Ewart Astill, ?Sam Staples, Harry Elliott (reserve ‘keeper) and Ernest Tyldesley all doing so the side was still a strong one.

The first choice as captain was Jackson, but he had a nervous breakdown and withdrew. It was only then that Stanyforth was appointed to lead the side, and Sutcliffe’s opening partner ??at Yorkshire, Percy Holmes, took Jackson’s place in the party.

The Test series was an interesting one. Stanyforth’s men won the first two Tests, then drew the third before the home side squared the series by winning the fourth and fifth Tests. Due to ?an eye injury Stanyforth missed the final day of the fourth Test and the fifth when, at just 19, Stevens assumed the captaincy, an odd looking decision given that Wyatt also played in the match.

What was the verdict on Stanyforth’s four Tests? His batting was certainly no great shakes, his six innings bringing just 13 runs at 2.60. Behind the stumps he held seven catches and made two stumpings. He conceded 50 byes in the seven innings for which he was behind the stumps – tellingly his deputy, Derbyshire’s Elliott, conceded just one in the final Test.

So why, given that he had never played for Yorkshire before, did Stanyforth suddenly turn out for the county in those three matches in 1928? There is no definitive answer, but a couple of f??actors have been suggested. First Yorkshire’s long serving ‘keeper, Arthur Dolphin, had retired at the end of the 1927 season, so there was a vacancy. 

Arthur Wood, who had played a solitary match the previous summer, played in the first few matches of the 1928 campaign, and then Stanyforth had his three opportunities before Wood returned for th??e rest of the season, and indeed for the rest of the inter-war years. In his three matches Stanyforth conceded 61 byes, and whilst he was marginally better with the bat than he had been in the Tests the previous winter he still only had 26 runs to show for three completed innings.

Did Yorkshire see the 36 year old as a future captain? The previous winter had seen the county looking around for a new appointee on the retirement of Major Arthur Lupton and, in the absence of any o??bvious amateur candidate Sutcliffe was eventually offered the job, o??nly for him to politely decline. In the event the 38 year old William Worsley, who in time inherited his father’s Baronetcy, became skipper, but perhaps Stanyforth was seen as a future candidate?

Despite his age and limited succ?ess in South Africa Stanyforth had one more overseas tour with England, to the Caribbean in 1929/30. No doubt expecting an easy ride after their 3-0 hammering of the same opposition in 1928 the selectors picked two 50 year olds, George Gunn and Wilfred Rhodes amongst a generally aging squad and were duly held to a 1-1 draw. Stanyforth played in four matches on the tour managing just four runs and three catches ??before a hand injury forced him to travel home. Realistically he was never likely to add to his four caps, a young Les Ames appeared in all the Tests and was presumably always going to do so, injury permitting. 

The Caribbean trip was, effectively, the end of Stanyforth’s career in major cricket. There were a few more First Class matches for MCC and Free Foresters the last of which was in 1933, and after that it was club cricket only for the man who, as a Major, had left the Arm?y in 1930. From there he had returned to duty with the Duke of Gloucester in which? role he must have had some sort of involvement in the abdication crisis in 1936.

Also in the 1930s Stanyforth contributed a few articles on wicketkeeping to The Cricketer a?t ??the request of the editor, his old friend Warner. There was even a book in 1935, a modest instructional text, which sadly gives no real flavour of Stanyforth the man.

The Second World War saw Stanyforth serve his country once more. In his late forties he did not see active service as such, but was one of the last officers to be evacuated from Dunkirk. After that his role was as a staff officer, and he ended his service, by then a ?Lieutenant Colonel, in 1946.

His military career at an end Stanyforth, by then a married man, did retur?n for a time to the Royal Household, and he was involved with the MCC and, to a lesser extent, Yorkshire. A wealthy man in his own right after his father’s death the Stanyforths divided their ?time between Kirk Hammerton Hall and London, and they also had a home in Kenya that they would visit in the winter months. 

Sadly for Stanyforth his retirement was not destined to be a lengthy o??ne. In his final years he was dogged by ill health and died at the age of 7??1 in 1964. His widow survived him for another twenty years, but she did not stay in Yorkshire, Kirk Hammerton Hall and all its contents being sold in the months following Stanyforth’s passing.

*England’s Youngest Captain: The Life and Times of Monty Bowden and Two South African Journalists by Jonty Winch, published in 2003

**In fact I am pretty sure there are three, plenty of evidence supporting the contention that there was a second and older sister who ?was brought up in and spent her life in France.

This series of player cards by Scanlens featured the five teams involved across a two-year?? cycle of World Series Cricket in Australia, sponsored by tobacco company Benson & Hedges. It was the first southern summer since the end? of the standoff between the Packer Network which had created World Series Cricket, and the sport’s establishment. When the truce was sealed, Packer’s Channel Nine was granted exclusive rights to televise the matches. These were new times in cricket, with day/night games played under floodlights at night, coloured uniforms, big gates and slick tv coverage, generating merchandise such as the cards.

My starting point of interest was New Zealand’s involvement in the 1980/81 World Series Cup alongside Australia and India. The excitement of the new product and the high drama in some of the games, culminating in the underarm controversy in the finals, earned cricket a lot of new Antipodean followers of whom I was one. A year or so later, the Scanlens cards started to turn up in the sweaty hands of kids in Wellington, sold with bubblegum at dairies (general stores). For ages, I had only about twelve of the cards – including a couple of double-ups: India’s Gundappa Viswanath and Gary Troup of New Zealand – until someone along the road traded me several dozen cards which gave me momentum to pick up the rest of the pack before long.

Thanks to that summer, New Zealand’s beige glory days and their yellow chested enemies with big moustaches are well etched into my memory. Cricket felt exciting at that time. Not just because I was a kid starting to play? the game myself, but because the format of One Day Internationals, cricket in bright colours, had revolutionised the sport. The next big revolution of course was about three decades later with the rise of T20 cricke??t. 

If there were any remaining doubts that the rise of T20 cricket has dramatically changed the approach of batsmen in other formats, the 2023 edition of the ODI World Cup should have put paid to that. There’s never been a time when batsmen have had it so good, what with fielding restrictions, flat pitches, smaller boundaries, chunkier bats and improved protective equipment. This is good if you are attracted to the game by big hits and large totals. But it’s sometimes forgotten in the frenzy of sixes how a compelling ODI cricket game can also involve test match-like passages where the real chess action happens: mind games and crunch points??; swings and roundabouts; patience and attrition; survival against the odds; late twists.

For us across the Tasman Sea, the World Series Cup in Australia in 1980/81 became compulsory television viewing as the competition progressed, and New Zealand’s confidence and success as a team grew. It was something of a coming of age for the sport in New Zealand. Part of the appeal was the success of Richard Hadlee, a champion who needs no introduction, and we soon realised why Australian crowds abused him so much – because deep down they respected him. He was the kind of player who drew crowds. The importancr of drawing crowds was something both the Packer Network and the sport’s establishment including the Australian Cricket Board could agree on, following the end of their bitter standoff. When the truce was sealed, Packer’s Channel Nine was granted exclusive rights to televise the matches. These were new times in cricket.

Post truce

Less known to me was the first iteration of this World Series Cup tri-series format which Australia would go on to host for decades to come. The 1979/80 World Series Cup also involved England and the West Indies who both toured Australia at the same time. Strangely, the respective test series against the touring teams were played?? concurrently. So Australia’s first test against the West Indies was followed by its first test against England before the second test against the West Indies? and so on. Furthermore, the 14 matches of the one-day tri-series were played in and around the six tests. It was an intense season for Australian captain Greg Chappell, which was followed by an even busier season the following year, which may explain his burnt-out state of mind when he instructed his brother to bowl the infamous underarm delivery on February 1st, 1981. 

However, in those last weeks of the 70s, Chappell and co went into battle against Clive Lloyd’s World Champion West Indies side and England led by Mike Brearley. The English refused to put the Ashes on the line for the test series. This was just as well because Australia won 3-nil, a far cry from a year earlier when Brearley’s team toured and thrashed an Australia? team that was without its main players who were off competing in Packer’s World Series Cricket. 

England’s 5-1 victory retaining the Ashes in 1978/79 had been achieved by much the same squad who returned the following year. Again under the wing of assistant manager Ken Barrington, who’d led a cheery squad to Au??stralia the previous southern summer, the English arrived in Sydney in early November and stayed in Australia for over three months. 

Among them was Geoff Boyco?tt, one of the all-time great batsmen, a Yorkshireman known both for his huge accumulation of runs and a reputation for selfishness which put him offside with many teammates and administrators over the years, but also helped his team win fairly often. On the cusp of 40, Boycott was on track to become England’s most prolific batsmen in tests, having already become one of the few to score a hundred first class centuries. However despite being up against a weakened Australia side, Boycott had performed poorly down under in 78/79.

Return down under

That earlier tour came at a bleak time for Boycott, especially as his mother had just died of cancer. Even though from a team spirit perspective the tour was one of the most harmonious, Boycott’s life was in turmoil. Without scoring his normal heap of runs, Boycott fell into a slump worsened by off-field issues, chiefly the protracted controversy over the captaincy of his county, Yorkshire. He was withdrawn and frequently found himself the butt of practical jokes by the young all rounder and rising star Ian Bo??tham who once purposely ran out Boycott when batting with him in a test in order to help revive  the team’s run rate. They’d given the star batsman a ridiculous nickname, ‘Fiery�? with apologies to another all time great from Yorkshire who had that tag first.

The Boycott who arrived in Australia in late 1979 was far more together and in form. He would need to be because this time England wasn’t facing Australia’s B or C team, but instead the top team. Chappell led a full strength side, with a brutish pace attack led by firebrand spearhead Dennis Lillee and including Jeff Thompson, Len Pascoe and Rodney Hogg, a gang of ultra-macho speedsters just waiting to grind the Poms into the hard Australian dirt to balance the l??edger after the 1978/79 Ashes fiasco.

Australian revenge was exacted in the tests. England bow?led well but failed to post competitive totals. Chappell and Allan Border led with the bat for Australia while Lillee grabbed plenty of wickets. For England, only Botham scored a century. Boycott however notched one standout test performance in Perth when he was stranded on 99*. It wasn’t the only time tha??t southern summer that he’d carried his bat. He then did it again during the ODI series, which was when England played its best cricket that summer, a dynamic tournament in which not only did Boycott have to face Australia’s pace attack, but also the West Indies�?four-headed battery of Andy Roberts, Michael Holding, Joel Garner and Colin Croft, the most feared bowling attack of modern times.

White balls under lights

England largely refused to wear coloured clothing for the ODIs. Its players stayed in whites, but had the option of dark blue pads and gloves, which Boycott and others opted for on occasion. However England reluctantly agreed to the use of white balls during day night fixtures. Mainly the team was familiar with the 50-over format. Although one-day international cricket was still in its infancy, the limited overs competitions had been played in England’s county scene for a lon??g time. Earlier that year, England lost to the West Indies in the ODI World Cup final at Lords. Boycott played a prominent role in that game, giving his team a chance of victory in a big opening stand with Brearley, but also unfortunately complicating his team’s chances of winning by neglecting to increase the run rate in time.

Lessons were learnt by England, including not to bat Boycott and Brearley together at the top of the order. So that’s how they did it in Australia. Boycott opened, while Brearley came in around 6. For Boycott it was a sequence of innings that would confound those critics who said his batting style was too negative for the new format. For me this was brought into focus decades later when I stumbled upon a book summarising the summer’s limited overs cricket by Packers PBL publishing arm. The book – appropriately titled ‘One-Day Cricket�? was on sale at a second hand bookstore on Ghuznee Street, and I didn’t hesitate to purchase it. Compiled mainly by Richie Benaud, the book features match reports and photos which brought alive those images on the Scanlens cards, as well as handwritten scorecards. Those scorecards are evidence of a series which stands as an outlier in Boycott’s international record.

The Yorkshireman wasn’t picked for England’s first outing in the comp, a 2-run win over the West Indies, some sort of consolation after Lords a few months earlier. But w?hen England’s team sheet to play Australia at Melbourne on December 8th was issued, Boycott’s name was at the top of the batting order. Cricket journalists and commentators were doubtful whether he would do well in the fast-paced limited overs games.

Shot maker

Brearley opted to field first at the MCG, and Australia scored 207 in their fifty overs. Boycott was textbook correct as ever, and from early on showed a hunger for singles. He got England off to a 71-run opening stand with Derek Randall in 21 overs before putting the foot down with Peter Willey in a second wicket stand of 63 in just 47 minutes. Since being torn to shreds by Hogg the season earlier, England batted cautiously against this moody speedster. Lillee was also in outstanding form that Summer and took many English wickets, so the tourists had their work cut out for them. But Boycott was able to comfortably milk runs off all of the Australian bowlers. He looked i??n control ag?ainst short balls. From the commentary box, Bill Lawry remarked that “he’s a good player off the back foot when he’s in touch and prepared to play his shots�? Boycott’s 68 off 85 balls included seven boundaries. England won by three wickets in the 49th over.

Three days later, the same two sides squared off in Sydney. Lillee and Thomson tore in with a vengeance, but prioritised speed and venom over accuracy. Boycott stroked the ball through covers off the front foot, rocked on to the backfoot for p??unches through point, and guided balls off his hips into gaps with ease. An opening stand with Ran?dall was worth 78, before a partnership with Willey produced 118 runs in just 74 minutes. The Australians were worked all around the SCG, as keen running between the wickets applied pressure on the homeside. Boycott notched his first ODI century before being bowled by Lillee for 105, scored in 124 balls including seven boundaries, which was a pretty decent clip for those times. This was still over four decades away from the phenomenon known as BazBall, and strike rates were usually well below where they tend to be nowadays. England went on to a total of 264, which Australia fell 72 runs short of. Boycott was Man of the Match.

England had won three games from three and looked the form team until they came up against an impregnable batting display by West Indies in match 7 of the tournament in Brisbane, two days before Christmas. Andy Roberts bowled brilliantly for figures of 3 for 26 of??f his ten overs, working the Englishmen over with supreme line and length as well as that famous nasty bouncer he would produce after lulling batsmen into a false sense of security with a slower bouncer. Boycott stood firm as a rock against the assault, keeping a cool head throughout, slashing a short ball from Roberts over gully for 4 at one point. Mostly his innings was b??uilt on runs in the inner circle, hit with deft placement while combining in partnerships of 97 with Gower and 70 with Willey. The Yorkshireman was out for 68 off 117 balls with three 4s. England’s total of 217 was overhauled by the West Indies with several overs to spare, as Viv Richards and Gordon Greenidge both scored 85 not out. The West Indians looked to be on another level from England, while Australia were lagging both teams by quite a distance in this competition.

Sydney fireworks

Boycott had made his mark, but wasn’t yet finished. It was his fourth and final tour of Australia as a player. He was vastly experienced now and although this tour was arduous he was well up to the task, thriving. A particular comment in the middle of this long ODI competition summed up his form. It was before the start of play in Match 8 on Boxing Day 1979, England v Australia in Sydney, when Brearley and Chappell converged in the middle of the SCG for the toss. Chappell won and opted to bat. Immediately following this the TV continuity man sidled up to him and Brearley for quick comment. The England skipper was in a slightly dreamy mode – it was the morning after the English tourists�?christmas party, which he and the broadcaster had a chuckle about. Brearley was asked if he was happy with Boycott’s form.

“He’s played exceptionally well, certainly better than he feared, and better than a lot of people exp?ected,�?Brearley replied.&nb?sp;

It was a notable day for Australia. The former captain, Ian Chappell, was back in the side after a brief time on the sidelines while he faced disciplinary action for arguing with an umpire in Sheffield Shield cricket, and also after reconsidering his international retirement. Streetwise ‘Chapelli�?helped his side break the shackles that the English bowlers had imposed on scoring. He blazed a top score of 60 whi?le his brother Greg scored 52. 

Later, under lights, England were chasing Australia’s target of 194 which started to look rather competitive when the tourists crashed to 179 for 6 after losing five wickets in the space of 27 runs. Hogg and Pa??scoe were the destroyers. Luckily for England, Boycott played the anchor and paced himself superbly. His vast powers of concentration were evident in the face of multiple distractions such as streakers invading the pitch, amid the constant roar from a speedway event next to the ground, not to mention the fireworks display that began when the event at the showground ended, shrouding the SCG in the mist for twenty minutes while the game continued. It was a crazy summer evening throughout which the opening batsman kept his cool.

Boycott’s innings c??ontained few uncontrolled shots. He punished the slightest bad balls. One particular straight drive for 4 back past Pascoe had a ferocity to it that people didn’t normally associate with Boycott. Benaud, commentating at the time, noted a “tremendous whack�? There was another century stand with Willey before England’s collapse. The cause was almost lost. But with his Yorkshire teammate David Bairstow, Boycott methodically guided England to victory with five overs to spare. He was 86 not out, scored off 134 balls, including 6 boundaries. Another Man of the Match performance.

Finals

England qualified first for the finals and Boycott sat out their last two round robin games. By the time the best-of-3 finals came around it came as no surprise that the finalists from the World Cup would be squaring off again. First to Sydney on January 20th, 1980, for what turned o??ut a thriller. The West Indies had the most explosive batting line-up in the world but a combination of Brearley’s savvy field placings, good bowling and excellent fielding restricted them to 215-8 batting first. Boycott was always going to be central to England’s chances of victory. Again he combined well with Willey in a second-wicket stand of 61 before he holed out to backward square leg off Roberts who was in devastating form and finished with 3-30 off his ten overs. Boycott’s 35 runs had been scored off 66 balls with just one boundary, the only time in the series that he failed to pass 50. Anyone facing the West Indian attack would have struggled to score prolifically. Roberts was miserly, Holding was sometimes unplayable and the towering Garner and Croft proved  especially difficult to score off as their lengths and angles were often d??angerous. England lost by 2 runs despite valiant late efforts by Brearley.

The second final two days later was at Melbourne where England batted first. Boycott was in control from the outset, spanking Croft with a straight drive for 4 before stroking Garner’s rising length through coverpoint for a beautiful boundary. He shared good partnerships with Gower and Graham Gooch, turning the strike masterfully in the face of hostile bowling. Making runs with a minimum of fuss, Boycott was, in the words of Lawry, unrecognisable from the player who toured Australia a year earlier. While he was batting, England were well set for a competitive total. Unfortunately, after Roberts dismissed Boycott, England’s innings lost momentum and they posted just 208-8 after 50 overs. In the end the West Indies made th?e series win look easy. Greenidge blasted 98 not out to guide the West Indies home with a few overs to spare, combining with Richards who s?cored yet another 50 and won the Man of the Series award. Boycott had scored 63 off 92 balls with 8 boundaries.

Stats

That summer, Richards was the most destructive batsman in the world. He was the leading figure in the West Indies�?emphatic 2-0 test series win over Australia. His form carried over into the ODI series when he was head and shoulders above every other batsman, although Boycott got closest, which wouldn’t have been on anyone’s bingo card before the series. So while Richards amassed 485 runs from 7 innings at an ave?rage of 97, Boycott had scored 425 runs from six innings at an average of 85, including four half-centuries. The ne??xt best average was that of Greenidge with 67.33 across 8 innings for 404. 

To underline how well Boycott had done, we can also look at the strike rates. Here, Richards was well in front with 95.09, however one should note that he didn’t have to face Roberts, Garner, Holding and Croft. Of the six batsmen who scored more than 300 runs in the series, Boycott had the second best strike rate with 68.77, better than Chappell, Greenidge, Willey and Alvin Kalli??chara?n.

Boycott had harnessed all his powers of concentration and the solid foundation of his batting technique in order to not just preserve his wicket and accumulate steady runs, but to build partnerships that gave England the best chance of competitive totals. He had extraordinary success with the solid Willey. The six partnerships between them during the series totalled 437 runs at an average of 72.83 per stand. With Gower, Boycott averaged 47.5 runs across 4 partnerships. Over the same number of partnerships, Boycott and Randall averaged 40, while Boycott and Gooch averaged 30. The Yorkshireman was the standout player in an England side with at lea?st five all-time greats in it (including fast bowler Bob Willis whose turn it was to have a lean season). 

Straight drive

The images of England’s players featured in the Scanlens card set are not the most exciting, especially compared to the flair of the West Indians or the sky blue panache of India. Perhaps it was the plain white uniforms that made England’s team s??eem a little dull, although Randall in mid-air cutting high through point always looked dramatic to me, and Bairstow’s high leap to catch a return throw nicely captured his plucky, fighting character that served England well when he played. But the best card of the England squad was Boycott and his gladiatorial straight drive. There’s something distant about the picture, perhaps like Boycott himself. ?Always somewhat remote from the mere mortals around him, Boycott still showed he was prepared to get stuck in and fight to the end.

The doubters would continue to have their say about his overall legacy, his selfishness and the dourness of his batting. Yet no one can deny that Boycott was capable of taking things to a higher level, of accelerating his batting attack. The 1979/80 series is proof. Four 50s and a century from six innings is testament not simply to Boycott’s great  judgement of line and length, but powers of concentration too. Succeeding on the field, he was also seen to have enjoyed himself socially throughout the summer, as suggested by a photo of him, taking o?ver the turntables from a DJ at a Sydney nightclub early in the new year. It was a fresh decade with new o??pportunities opening up for the professional cricketer, and here was Boycott dominating still. Rarely had he ba??tted so positively against such high quality bowling, and certainly not in ODIs.

For Boycott, there would be more scandals to come in his storied career: ditching the national team in India mid-tour; revolt against the Yorkshire club management over the captaincy; taking a rebel England team to South Africa. He has always been someone who attr?acted controversy, perhaps even courted it. A great cricketing mind, ultimately when he was successful there was a good chance that the England or Yorkshire teams he was in would win, even if it did involve slow run rates. But during that southern summer of 79/80, Boycott had batted against the world’s best fast bowling att??acks in pressure cooker environments and prospered. It was a fiery summer.

DEAD RUNS EXAMPLE 1

BRADMAN – Aus vs West Indies
Melbourne, Feb 1931 (4th Test)
Initial Aus/WI series

WI 1st inns, 99 runs
Aus 1st inns, 328/8 dec (Bradman 152)
So lead is 229

Aus 2nd inns: assume, Minimum of  250 runs

In this series, Aus other 2nd inns: 172/0 and, on a sticky pitch, 220.
Aus co??mpleted 1st inns of 376, 369, 558 ??and, on sticky pitch, 224. Kippax, McCabe, Ponsford and Woodfull doing well (besides Bradman)

Target for WI 2nd inns would then be 479 runs.
The Remote Possibility is put at 370 (ie 109 less), representing notional 1 in 20 odds.
This implies a safe 1st inns dec by Aus at 219 (instead of at 328, being 109 less).

Rationale:

?In this series, WI highest 2nd inns total is 249 (Headley only 11), all others being below 200;

And WI highest 1st inns is 350/6 (H??eadley 105)? with wickets then tumbling.

Previously, a final inns target of 370 had been reached or exceeded in all Tests only 3 time?s, highest 411 (all post-WW1).

Br??adman was out when Aus score was on 2??86 with 67 team Dead Runs then accumulated.

He s?cored twice as fas?t as his partners, ratio of 66:34.

So 66% of 67 Dead Runs are attributed to Bradman = 44 (best estimate)

Set within limits of 31 and 57 for him – reflecting alternative estimates of the
remote possibility starting at 350 or 390.

DEAD RUNS EXAMPLE 2

BRADMAN �?Aus vs South Africa

Adelaide, Jan 1932 (4^th Test)

SA 1^st inns, 308 runs

Aus 1^st inns, 513 (Bradman 299*) �?lead of 205

Aus 2^nd inns: assume, Minimum 270 runs

In thi?s series, only 2 of Aus 6 inns are unde??r 450, being 1st innings of?? 198?? (Bradman’s 2, his only failure) and, on very sticky pitch, 153.

Target for SA 2^nd inns would then be 475 runs.

The Remote Possibility is put as starting at 390 (i?e 85 lower)?, the notional 1 in 20 chance.

Implies a safe 1^st inns dec by Aus at 428 (instead of 513).

Rationale:

In this series, SA highest inns is 358 (3rd Test), with highest 2nd inns of 274 and 225.   ??                  &nb?sp;       

390 been exceeded only twice in all Tests before then, highest 411?????????????????????????? (both times post-WW2).

Bradman was undefeated at close of Aus 1^st inns when 85 team Dead Runs had accumulated.

He scored faster than his partners, rat??io of 65:35.

So 65% of 85 Dead Runs are attributed to Bradman = 55 (best estimate).

Within limits of 42 and 68 for him �?reflecting alternative estimates of the remote possibility starting at 370 and 410.

DEAD RUNS EXAMPLE 3

BRADMAN �?Aus vs England

Melbourne, Jan 1937 (3^rd Test)

Aus (200) led England (76 on a “gluepot�?pitch) by 124 runs on 1^st inns.

Then Aus saw out the difficult conditions with its tail-enders and went on to amass 564 runs in 2^nd inns, with Bradman (270) and Fingleton (136), both in the lower middle-order, making nearly three-quar??ters of them.

So Eng were set the colossal target of 689 runs.

The Remote Possibility is put as starting at 440 runs (representing the 1 in 20 chance) �?implying a cut of 249 to Aus 2^nd inns, with a declaration at 315.

Rationale:

• • • England’s 2nd inns totals i??n this series didn’t ex??ceed 330, but they posted 426/6 in the 2nd Test First inns (Hammond double century).

• • • Highest final innings be?fore then was 411, by England at Sydney in Dec 1924 (with two scores just past 100 and 2 just past 50).

Bradman was out with the score on 549, so team dead Runs had by then accumulated to 23??4.

He was again outscoring partners by 65:35, giving him 152 Dead Runs.

Within a range of 139 to 16??5 Dead Runs on alternative remote possibility estimates of 420 and 460?? runs.

DEAD RUNS EXAMPLE 4

BRADMAN �?Aus vs England

Sydney, Dec 1946 (2nd Test)

Australia replied to England’s modest 1st inns of 255 with a massive 659/8 dec �?a lead of 404 runs. Barnes and Bradman each mad?e 234.

Remote Possibility for England’s 2nd inns put at 430, given its 2nd inns totals in this series of 371, 310/7?? (top scores 112 and 53) and 340/8 dec (top scores 103 and 76). Represents the 1 i?n 20 chance.

A team score of 430 has been exceeded eight times in a final innings in all Test history, and ??approached by South Africa vs England in 1947 (423/7).

Aus 2nd inns assumed, as a Minimum, to be 230 �?in light of its 253 and 214/5 in ??the final T??est of this series.

This implies a safe Aus 1st inns dec at 455, with a lead of 200. Bradman was out at 564 with team Dead Runs by then 1??09.

Bradman scored faster than Barnes, his partner throughout, at 60:40. So ??60% of 109 gives Bradman’s own Dead Runs, ie 65.

Alternative estimates are for the Remote Possibility to occur at 41?0 or 450 (the latter being equalled/exceeded four times in Test history), implying Bradman’s Dead Runs are within the range of 53 and 77.

In standardising the raw averages, Dead Runs is one of four factors taken into account, along with use of dominance ratings, long-run improvement in batting expertise and career length. This factor has been especially important in the case of Bradman (assessed at around 10% of his total career runs), and ranging between 2.0% and 5.0% of total runs scored for three-quarters of the other 172 leading Test batsmen selected across the eras.[ii]

The innovation has come in for scepticism and criticism from a number of participants in a CW Forum in November 2023 on my standardisation exercise and also some correspondence in the ACS journal. After recapping on the concept and how it is applied, the intent is to summarise the critics�?points, discuss their validity, and consider if my treatment of Dead Runs needs to be improved on or perhaps even be abandoned. It is thought that the debate may be of general interest to those who engage (in some way or other) with Cricket Web.

There are, of course, many interesting ways in which batting performance has been evaluated – incorporating factors such as strike rate, consistency of scoring, proportion of fifties and centuries made as well as contributions to team wins. Yet the traditional “runs scored per completed innings�?retains its interest as a readily accessible single, and frequently quoted, statistic. 

Identifying Dead Runs

The considerations applied in pro?nouncing r?uns to be dead:

• The focus is on those runs that are scored after a stage is reached when the opposition is considered to have only a remote possibility of winning the contest; and so the team in question is deemed to have only a remote possibility of losing, with a victory or perhaps a draw being the only realistic outcomes for itself.
  
  
• I have sought to make a “remote possibility�?operational by applying a likelihood of the opposition winning (by a slender margin) of around 1 in 20, based on the observed capabilities of their players. When matters reach this stage, Dead Runs then set in, making no material enhancement to the prospect of securing victory.
  
  
• I contend that when the odds of being defeated fall to around this level, the captain cannot reasonably be accused of behaving in an unduly risky or cavalier way, at least in normal circumstances.
  
  
• (It might be rational to declare well before that stage is reached if, by then, a draw is most likely – ie risk losing in order to try to force a win, depending on the position reached in the series. But this complication doesn’t affect the rest of this discussion.)

Runs of negligible worth, in my sense, occur due to the captain being excessively cautious, to the point of being unsound or irrational (such as Bill Woodfull’s marked tendency during Bradman’s time), or the captain has simply let matters drift without sufficie??nt attention.

Why Discarded

Dead Runs are wholly discounted – eliminated – in standardising batting averages and arriving at an indicative merit ordering, because:

• Not only are they irrelevant to the team’s cause, which is the rationale for all scoring. They can be, and often are, counter-productive as their accumulation makes it increasingly possible that the opposition will be able escape with a draw as remaining playing time shrinks and maybe bad weather lurks.
  
  
• One contention concerns the case of timeless Tests (to be played to a finish) – routinely staged in Australia prior to WW2 and elsewhere as an occasional series tie-breaker – which is that excessive runs in the confines of a specific match actually had a positive value in the context of the series as a whole as they served to exhaust and demoralise the opposition. But this point has little force as these matches were generally well spaced, with typical intervals between them of ten to twenty days. Dead Runs were then simply without any purpose. In the case of Bradman’s six timeless matches in which he struck Dead Runs, only one exceeded four days (extending to five and a half days); so there were no prolonged exertions.[iii]
  
  
• Whilst it is the captain who lets Dead Runs accumulate, they are fully deducted from the totals of those who do the scoring. It is true that from the batsman’s perspective, with the psychological pressure to perform well being lifted, further runs become that much easier to make; and the opposition bowlers by this time are likely to be tiring and perhaps losing their focus. However, these runs are deducted from their scores on the “no help to the team�?premise.

Probing the Criticisms

It is widely agreed that runs far beyond their need do occur in some Test matches, and not only when batting third and setting a target. Striking examples are Australia’s first innings compilation of 674 against India at Adelaide in January 1948 (4^th Test), 380 being the visitors�?highest total in the entire series; and Australia’s 469 in reply to South Africa’s first innings of 153 at Sydney in December 1931, the visitors arriving wit?h only two high quality batsmen.

(i) A fundamental point made at the CW Forum is that, in constructing a merit rating/ordering, whether or not to exclude Dead Runs is matter of personal opinion, and that individual tastes will differ on this matte??r. I fully agree, though without explicitly acknowledging this until now, and elaborate by saying that what ought to constitute, or qualify, as “merit�?in a role is not something that can be proved or shown to be correct.

Similarly, personal views of this kind are embedded in various, widely accepted, batsmen (and bowler) rating schemes �?though often claiming to be wholly objective because, once set, only hard verifiable data are fed in to produce the finding. Yet what factors are to be included, and excluded, and the relative importance to be assigned to them are matters of personal opinion of an individual or panel – as for instance with Wisden and ICC ratings of batsmen’s innings. This is unavoidable – inherent in any merit rating scheme.

In Wisden’s case, it has determined the best individual innings in Test matches, with a ranking of the top 100 men, each being accorded as a merit rating denoted by a specified num??ber of points �?maximum pos??sible being 300 (released in July 2001).

Its scheme has 12 indicators of merit such as �?in addition to number of runs scored �?proportion of team runs scored, pitch quality, strength of opposition bowling, pressure faced  at the start and end of his innings, wickets falling during his stay, support received from colleagues during his innings and support given to tail-enders. Unfortunately, we are not told about their relati??ve significance and the resulting trade-offs. For instance, is poor pitch quality deemed to be as significant as strong bowling faced, or rated as twice as important or what? Does a good batting pitch offset strong bowling? And so on. But whatever are the trade-offs actually applied, there will be plenty of scope for differing personal opinions among knowledgeable people about what they ought to be, implying a different merit ordering of the very same innings.

Steve Ferrier, a well regarded researcher, has constructed his own greatest 100 Test innings using only 8 indicators, three of which differ from those of Wisden (Cricket Web, September 2014). So there’s clearly room for debate also on what factors are worthy of inclusion and don’t meas?ure essentially the same thing.

(ii) The Forum also produced some opposition to completely discounting Dead Runs. This would fit the unconstrained perspective of a batsman’s demonstrated ability, recognising that the pressure is off once the opposition cannot win the match (cut a third or a half of these runs?). Also, perhaps, factor in that as Dead Runs start to be accumulated things tend to become dull for spectators – the contest itself petering-out into a one-way street with a potential dead end.

(iii) The Forum discussion rightly emphasised that the task of determining the scale of Dead Runs struck in any given match is certainly a difficult one, and inevitably involves a good deal of judgement. Yet Test captains frequently have to weigh the odds of the opposition being able to meet potential targets as the match progresses – if only intuitively. They also have to decide what odds are acceptable. I try to mimic the captain in this respect, with the 1 in 20 odds mentioned earlier, and judge at what stage of the team’s innings these have applied. This judgement is informed by:

• • • examining the recent form of the opposition players in the current series, or prior matches if at the start of the series,
    • knowledge of highest fourth innings chases in general when a stiff target is presented,
    • specifying an upper and lower range for the number of Dead Runs struck and taking the mid-point as the best estimate (with a panel of assessors, taking the average of the individuals�?best estimates).

In this way, I try to minimise the problem of getting the resulting estimate of Dead Runs accepted. Even so, Martin Chandler (for one) struggles with how such runs could ever be quantified satisfactorily – some runs are unarguably dead, but then there are areas that get greyer and greyer.

A test of this proposition could be to have a panel of 3 or 5 “knowledgeable” individuals – armed with information just touched on – make estimates of Dead Runs for a series of specified cases and then see if the divergence between their estimates is small or large. “Large” would indicate the task is too fraught with uncertainty to be acceptable. For material cases (Dead Runs of 20 or more in an innings), a large difference could be denoted by a spread around the average finding of at least 60%.

Looking externally, I note that personal judgements also enters decisions taken, for example, with Wis??den’s and the ICC’s batsmen ratings about how best to measure factors such as bowling strength faced (should runs per dismissal, economy rate and strike rate all enter?), and pitch quality (rely on runs scored/wickets taken during a match or amount of seam movement and t?urn extracted?).

(iv) In commenting on an earlier draft, Martin Chandler was conscious of the fact that some runs are worth more than others, citing Graham Gooch’s (undefeated) 154 second innings runs against West Indies (Leeds, 1991) as being more valuable than his mammoth 333 against India (Lord’s, 1990). He is inclined to the view that, in an overall sense, conventional batting averages smooth these variations in value to the team in as good a way as any single indicator can. Don Bradman, though, is regarded as a special case – to be looked into.

Perhaps what might be termed Bradman’s �?em>decisive contributions�?to Test wins could be weighed against his “unarguably�?Dead Runs on a one-to-one basis. I have in mind identifying those matches that Australia would not have won without his overall contribution where he was also the team’s highest scorer (both innings added if Australia batted twice). In these cases, there would be a shortfall between the combined runs made by all other members of the team and the total that was just sufficient to produce the win. This shortfall would then count as his decisive contribution. If this is thought of as too ha??rsh, the contrasting alternative would be to take his own total after deducting both the average score made by the other specialist batsmen in the team and his “unarguably�?Dead Ru??ns.

Where the win is by a certain numbe??r of wickets and Bradman was the team’s highest scorer, one could take the excess of his runs per innings over those of the other batting specialists.  

(v) Some commentators express a dislike of mixing subjective factors (individual perception and interpretation) with an??alysis of a purely statistical nature, sometimes expressed as “individual opinion in the midst of otherwise statistical analysis�?�?though the reason for this position isn’t clear in what I’ve read.

In contrast, I find this mixing of different animals to be acceptable practice so long as the subjective factors are thought significant for a rounded evaluation o??f performance. I believe that relevance should be the over-riding consideration. 

(vi) In a letter published in The Cricket Statistician journal (May 2024 Issue), Russell Houldin asserts that runs scored which are of little or no value to a team can be identified only after the match has been concluded, whereas I start counting these runs as a match unfolds. His reason being that “during an actual match one never knows what the outcome will be or the corresponding value of scoring runs at a particular time.�?/p>

Deducing if, and how many, Dead Runs have been accumulated from examining a completed scorecard sounds straightforward. Yet this is deceptive. A golfing tale provides a way into the problem. When Bryson DeChambeau struck the “bunker shot of my life�?onto the 18^th green in the recent US Open to make victory over Rory McIlroy a formality, ?instead of blaming the Gods, the moral was simply to accept it could have gone either way; and next time to strive to be ahead by ?a substantial safety margin before the closing stages.

Transferring this to cricket, it is the “safety margin�?that gives rise to a problem. How is the required margin to be established? The aim is to be sufficiently well placed during the later stages of an opposition’s fourth innings (or one’s own chasing innings) to provide insurance against potential bad luck – or potential lack of good luck. If a victory is by a single run, Dead Runs are nil by definition. What about a Test match win by 11 runs or 25 runs �?both seem too close for comfort, too small to entertain Dead Runs being scored. But what about a winning margin of 60 runs: after a high scoring match, this might not be regarded as comfortably safe yet after a low scoring match it might be regarded as ample. 

In looking back after winning by 60 runs, and thinking about whether this happens to be greater than a required safety margin – and so contains some Dead Runs – one is driven to pose “what if…�?questions about events during play. That is, to speculate about particular events which could easily have turned out differently and favoured the opposition.

How many more runs would the opposition have scored if, say, their in-form number six hadn’t run himself out with a foolish call, or their number seven hadn’t played his only rash shot to be caught when well set, or the umpire hadn’t ruled in favour of a dubious catch to make them eight wickets down. The likely scoring consequences if any one of these specific possibilities had materialised is not susceptible to estimation and is all the more uncertain when all three hypotheticals are taken together. Even informed guesses are fraught with difficulty as subsequent events could turn out in many alternative and unpredictable ways. This in turn means that the required safety margin is indeterminate, even after the match is finished and won. Hence whether any Dead Runs have been scored – and if so, how many – is also inherently indeterminate.

Nor can any excess of runs beyond some specified safety margin be attributed to particular batsmen in the order. A win by 90 runs with a safety margin of 40 yields 50 Dead Runs. As there is no specified stage when Dead Runs start being struck, only an end of match reckoning, these 50 runs can be trimmed off batsmen’s scores anywhere in the order. There will be a large number of possible combinations that exhaust the sum of 50 (10 or 15 runs off an opener who has made 30; 20 or 25 runs off the number four who has made 45�?. One could spread it across all batsmen on a neutral – equal proportional – basis. But this is hardly satisfactory.

With my approach, the focus is on what would have been a sound decision on a declaration in real time, ie as the match unfolds. The judgements taken on this can, of course, sometimes turn out to be incorrect after the event; or a loss eventuates because the odds of 1 in 20 carried some, albeit very low, risk. On checking the ?dead runs estimated for Bradman, plus those of his partners, which occurred in eight Test matches, these were far outweighed by the eventual w?inning margins. These margins were: more than a team innings in four cases, 10 wickets, 560 runs and 360 runs. One match was drawn due to rain saving England on the final day.

Conclusions

• Runs struck seemingly beyond their need should not necessarily be excluded from a batsman’s merit rating, though I happen to feel they should be.
  
  
• This preference is held despite a lot of judgement being involved, which is also present at a fundamental level in other
  widely accepted rating schemes, most notably those of Wisden and the ICC.
  
  
• The onus should be on the assessor to provide a reasoned explanation of the quantum of estimated Dead Runs. Unless this is done, it is unlikely that the result will be accepted other than by just a few.
  
  
• A test of whether Dead Runs can be established satisfactorily could be to examine the findings of the individuals comprising a panel of, say, 3 or 5 assessors. A small dispersion of findings would confirm this could be achieved, whilst a large dispersion would be to the contrary.
  
  
• Establishing Dead Runs after a match is completed is considered unsatisfactory as it is, in logic, an indeterminate exercise.

Please visit this thread on the CricketWeb Forum whe??re you can join the community discussion surrounding this article

End Notes

[i] Rescuing Don Bradman from Splendid Isolation, published by PK Associates, February 2019.

[ii] Based on a comprehensive analy?sis for 25 of th?e 172 batsmen.

[iii] Occasionally, even timeless Tests resulted in an abandoned draw. As with the final match of West Indies versus England in April 1930, to resolve the series: after seven days play and two rained-off, England’s booked voyage home intervened! Similarly, the final match of South Africa versus England in March 1939: this deal breaker came to an indeterminate ending after twelve days (three lost to poor weather) so as to enable the vi?sitors to catch their booked ship home.

Having retired from all cricket at the end of the 1982 English season, Brearley opted to move full-time to the life of the mind and the profession of psychoanalysis.   As an undergraduate Brearley had read Classics and Moral Sciences at St Johns’s College, Ca??mbridge, and subsequently embarked upon a lectureship in Philosophy a??t Newcastle University, a task which he combined with playing cricket for Middlesex.  As his professional cricket career neared its end, though, Brearley began to train in psychoanalysis in preparation for his life beyond the game.

The context of C.L.R James’s work – that of a Trinidadian-born intellectual and historian tracing his love of the game while simultaneously being the subject of colonial rule �?was, and is, doubly significant given Brearley’s observations of class differences in the English domestic game.  James�?work was published in the same year, 1963, in which the last Gentleman v. Players game was played.  Coming a year before Brearley received his county cap from Middlesex, the English game’s domestic version of cricketing apartheid was becoming a tired anachronism. In 1961, at the Scarborough Festival where a Gentleman v. Players fixture was in full swing, a young Brearley, just 18, had turned up at the dining table sans the obligatory dinner jacket. Later, ahead of the final game of its kind Brearley had dismissed the notion of the fixture as being one for �?em>old colonels�?

Brearley’s subject, C.L.R. James, was all too aware of the contradictions inherent in his fixation with a game which was a colonial implant. Such conflicts were evident even in his choice of team. As the academic Paul C. Hebert wrote in his review of Beyond a Boundary:

  For James, choosing a team to play for required navigating a complex system of overlapping social structures in which people sought to maintain whatever advantage their skin colour or class position gave them. White teams like Queen’s Park and Shamrock would not accept James because of his race, playing for Stingo, the team of “the plebeians, the butcher, the tailor, the candlestick maker, the casual labourer, with a sprinkling of the unemployed�?was not an option because it represented a step down for a middle-class man like James. Of the remaining possibilities–Maple, a team made up of “the brown-skinned middle class,�?where members tried to safeguard the social advantages of a lighter complexion, and Shannon, “the team of the black lower-middle class”–James chose Maple, a decision, that “delayed [his] political development for years�?by further isolating him from the popular masses.

Although James had authored the pamphlet The Case for West-Indian Self Government in 1936, he had also devoured, with relish, the Western literary and philosophical canon from a young age.  Speaking to an African-American scholar he said of himself �?em>I am a Black European, that is my training and outlook�?

For the cricketer turned philosopher turned psychoanalyst Brearley, his own contradictions were apparent and were also evident to the man himself. Asked about the antipathy which Australians crowds had displayed towards him during the 1979/80 England tour, Brearley professed that �?em>in the externals�?such as accent and university background he represented �?em>the kind of Englishman that they (the Australians crowds) were very suspicious of�? However, as Ian Botham’s biographer Simon Wilde had noted, Brearley was a much more layered p?ersonality when it came to his English teammates. Wilde wrote:

�?em>He (Brearley) was well grounded and pragmatic �?he was a doer as well as a thinker. His antecedent??s were far from grand and �?perhaps helpfully as far as Botham was concerned �?from the North. His grandfather, who came from Heckmondwike in Yorkshire, had been an engine-fitter as well as a lively fast bowler; his father Horace, while maintaining the family passion for cricket as a batsman, became a teacher in Sheffield and then in London. Brearley himself seemed happiest surrounded by hard-headed Northern cricketers such as Hendrick, Miller, Randall, Willey, Boycott, Taylor, and (if family origins count) Botham, while one of the few players with whom he failed to hit it off was Phil Edmonds, born in Zambia and every bit th?e bolshie colonial.�?/em>

 This very same independence of mind and originally of thought was evident to the journalist Paul Edwards, who, in a The Cricket Monthly interview, observed of Brearley �?em>He is suspicious of the British establishment yet also dislikes north-west London and Guardian-reading conformity. Kerry Packer was never his style, yet he understood the motivations of the cricketers who joined World Series Cricket and he was insistent they be picked on merit for the England team he captained in 1977�?

The ability to comprehend contradictory poses and concepts is perhaps inherent in Brearley’s training and mindset. It is also central to the Socratic method with which Brearley had applied to his subject C.L.R. James. Essentially, a technique which fosters self-discovery, since it involves in-depth questioning and discussion, the Socratic method in turn can reveal a greater depth of self-awareness and understanding, and even tease out and appreciate a subject’s own inherent contradictions. Just as Brearley was able to observe the injustices of apartheid when touring South Africa in 1964/5 and be vocal about the treatment meted out to Basil D’Oliveira by the England selectors in 1968/69, and take moral stances on both, so Brearley was able to insist that his own Packer-bound England teammates should be picked on merit.   

The popular image of Brearley is of English cricket’s grey eminence, certainly when considering his intellectual prowess and career post-cricket, alongside his literary output and demeanour as captain. As Jonathan Calder remarked in his Liberal England blog, �?em>When Brearley became England’s captain in 1977 it was almost as though Jonathan Miller or Michael Frayn had been put in charge. Brearley was a representative of liberal North London in an age when cricket was still run by the establishment.�?How ironic, then, that Mike Brearley??’s finest cricketing hour should be synonymous with a man, in Ian Botham, whose political outlook is the very ant??itheses of North London’s cultural establishment.

While Atherton debuted in the dreadful 4-0 home thumping that was the 1989 Ashes series, Hussain began in the Caribbean tour which followed in 1989/90. Ramprakash began his international career against West Indies in 1991 and, despite never topping the twenties that summer, looked the part.  Graham Thorpe was the last of the quartet to enter international cricket when he made a Test century on debut against Australia at Trent Bridge in 1993.  Thorpe was also the oldest to debut, at 24, while the other three all made their introductions to the Test arena at the age of 22.  The last to depart the international stage in 2005, Thorpe is also the one whose record – in sheer statistical terms, at least �?stands comparison with the some of the best of his era.   

Having made his first-class debut in the summer of 1988, the Surrey left-hander established himself as a regular in the 1989 season. After four overseas tours with England A, Thorpe finally made his Eng??land ??debut against Australia in that summer’s Trent Bridge Test.  At the age of 24, he would go on to become a mainstay of the English middle-order until his sudden exit at the age of 36 in 2005.  

Unlike Atherton, Ramprakash and Hussain, Thorpe never played alongside Botham, Gower, or Lamb. Although he played the first eighteen months of his international career alongside Graham Gooch, the Surrey man never imbibed the culture of the champagne-set as personified by those charismatic hedonists of the late 70s and the decade and a half which followed. When Botham, Lamb, and latterly Gower all to??ok their leave of international cricket against Pakistan in the s?ummer of 1992, it was at a time when the cult of the eighties dilletante was being brutally phased out.

Just as Thorpe never graced an England lineup with the departing heroes of 1992, he also operated at a time of home terrestrial television and before the arrival of Kevin Pietersen. Indeed, his international career reached its end after the second Test match �?his hundredth �?against Bangladesh in the summer of 2005. What followed was that seri??es against Australia in the second half of the summer, and the arrival of Pietersen to supplant Thorpe himself.

Following the 2-1 Ashes victory, OBEs, parades, and parties at 10 Downing Street, England’s cricket team became the property of television subscribers and a fan base largely peopled by a travelling band of the comfortably off.  Thorpe, then, can be located in a timeframe wedged between two distinct eras.  Although he rubbed shoulders as teammates with many of the heroes of 2005, his mainly undemonstrative on-field career came to an end before Michael Vaughan’s men bested Australia that year. As Pietersen’s cocksure approach and pyrotechnics took flight, England’s personality took on a different shade, with Flintoff becoming the most accomplished in a long line of Botham successors. Thorpe’s d??iligence and calm competence, along with Ramprakash’s earnest and ultimately flawed precocity, and Atherton’s updated Lancastrian take on the M.J.K Smith persona, became almost forgotten totems of a different age.

Which performances, then, were the hallmarks of Thorpe’s international career? In a hundred Test match career where he finished up with an average of 44.66, only against India (35.37) and South Africa (35.88) did his mean dip below 40. He averaged in excess of 50 against New Zealand and Pakistan, 49.42 against Sri Lanka, and 45.74 against the world’s best, the Australians.  Similarly, in 27 Tests against the West Indians he struck 1740 at 42.43. Averaging 45.17 in 49 home Tests and 44.16 in 51 overseas contests is also testamen?t to his consistency and mastery of different surfaces. Moreover, batting in his favoured position of number 5, he averaged 56.21 at Test level.

Among Thorpe’s signature innings during his England tenure is his debut 114 in July 1993. Unbeaten when Graham Gooch declared the innings, the left-hander had batted without fuss, but with a positivity and sense of calm which brightened an English summer which, once again, had been typified by some nervy and technically maladroit batting displays. In an attacking sense, very few English batting displays can hold a candle to Thorpe’s 2002 unbeaten double-hundred against New Zealand in Christchurch. Although he was later overshadowed by Nathan Astle’s fastest double-century in Test history, Thorpe’s 200* came from 231 balls and comprised 28 fours and four sixes. It was in early 2001, however, that Thorpe played his most accomplished Test match innings. In the deciding Test of a three-m?atch series against Sri Lanka in Colombo, Thorpe mastered Muralitharan to score an unbeaten 113 out of total of 249. With only Atherton, Trescothick and Vaughan reaching the twenties, Thorpe was out on his own. Similarly, his unbeaten 32 in a winning total of 74-6 led England home to victory in a low scoring match.

Although viewed as a quiet man, Thorpe was no shrinking violet and often had his clashes with authority. Ahead of his re??turn to the England set-up in 2003 Angus Fraser had questioned Thorpe’s ability to conform to the group ethos. David Lloyd, Bumble himself, had also questioned Thorpe’s attitude, basing his views on his experience of the left-hander while England coach during 1996-1999. When the torment of a failing marriage took its toll, Thorpe took an indefinite leave from the game in 2002, only to return and play more sporadically for England until his final retirement in June 2005.  His final stretch in England’s middle order, from the South African return in 2003 to that final encore against Bangladesh in 2005, saw him rack up 1511 runs at 54.  

Six years after Thorpe’s retirement in 2011, David Gower reckoned him the second-best England bat he had played with or commented on, while his Cricinfo profile lauds him as �?em>the most complete England batter since the Gooch-Gower�?era.  Although he did not, perhaps, convert as many fifties to hundreds as he should have, the sixteen he did notch were composed in a manner many of his England peers struggled to match.   Temperamental a??nd tormented Graham Thorpe may have occasionally been, but he was also ??one of England’s unsung and underappreciated batting gems of the last thirty years.

This material summarises concerns expressed in the Forum posts and, in light of these, outlines revisions?? made to the approach adopted and resulting changes to the ranking of players.

I have made two sets of revisions: one to reflect my own current thinking, and t??hen I’ve combined these with additional revisions which produces results that I think participants ?may in general prefer.

Concerns and What’s Been Done

Three main concerns were expressed:

• More clarity needed on the way Dead Runs were identified.
  .
  
• A small statistical base applying to a number of players, especially those with materially fewer than 20 innings.
  .
  
• A feeling that some players simply didn’t belong in very high company. 

Clarity on Dead Runs

• There was some misinterpretation of what I did, being partly my fault for not being clearer, and one view expressed that whether or not “dead runs�?should be discounted is a matter of personal opinion and therefore is contentious. 
  
• These matters have been addressed in my consolidated note already posted on the Forum thread.

Small Statistical Base

• In this “too few innings�?category are Barry Richards (7 inns), Taslim Arif (10 innings with one of these contributing as much as two-fifths of his total runs), and Stewie Dempster (15 innings) – plus five others having close to 20 innings, which was adopted as the general threshold. These exceptions were based on high calibre Test appearances cut short by illness, injury, or political sanctions, or interrupted by WWII. 
  .
  
• Of these eight “exception�?players, I have now eliminated Arif, Dempster and CAG Russell (18 innings), whilst still considering Barry Richards, Sid Barnes (19), Kumar Duleepsinhji (19), Vijay Merchant (18) and Alan Melville (19) are worth retaining given their credentials (as reflected, for instance, in Cricinfo player stats and potted biographies). None have Not Out innings exceeding 11%; Richards and Merchant with nil.
  .
• Barry Richards is perhaps the most controversial of these and I’ve argued his case in my article, touching on his eight innings in “Super Tests�?of the Packer era, averaging 79.1 (only one innings under 28 and two centuries), fronting up, as an opener, against Dennis Lillee in 5 innings and Roberts/Holding in one other innings – this coming nearly a decade after his Tests for South Africa. Also of note: his 342 innings for Hampshire (1968-78) yielding an average of 50.5 and his 160 innings for Natal (1964/5-1982/3) at an average of 59.3. 

Not Belonging 

• Initially, I thought this feeling of participants might have a connection to players with an abnormally high proportion of Not Out innings. 
  
  
• Adopting a threshold of 17.0 % or 1 in 6 innings (close to the high end for Cricinfo’s all-time leading Test averages for 64 players with an overall figure of 10.5%), I adjusted my batsmen’s raw averages in cases where they exceeded this level.
  
  
• Besides Arif (20%) and Dempster (26%) �?both already eliminated �?this netted Adam Voges (22.6 %), and four others though by small margins in their cases: Phil Sharpe (19.0%), Steve Waugh (17.7%), Shivnarine Chanderpaul (17.5%) and Charlie Davis (17.2%). Rather than project their Not Out innings to a notional conclusion (based on completed innings of the same and higher scores, which can involve complications), I simply reworked their averages assuming only 17.0% of Not Outs. This principally down-pointed Adam Voges.

A late inclusion �?Harry Brook

• Brook qualified with 20 innings just two weeks after my cut-off for the initial exercise.
  
  
• He has a “clean bill of health�? averaging 62.15 with only 1 Not Out and zero identified Dead Runs; only one large innings against a weak attack, and no very big innings distorting his average.

The main table – which follows – has been revised to incorporate these changes. It represents my own current thinking. 

I sus??pect that some participants may still have a number of reservations o??ver the revised ranking. I’ve considered two possible reasons:

1. The Ranking May Over-State Ability: for those with only 20-30 innings

From further ana??lysis, I think this t?o be unlikely in general:

1. Taking the top 14 players of the above table who have at least 50 innings and 10 more selected at random with 50 plus innings (24 players in all), only Bradman, Younis Khan and Pujara didn’t improve on their initial 20 innings when they reached 50 innings. The former were a down a touch on 20 innings (official) averages of 99.4 and 41.2; whilst Pujara dropped from 61 to 49.
   


2. All except five improved their average when moving from 20 to 30 innings, two of whom maintained their average unchanged.
   


3. Each of the 24 players examined had a wide variety of scores in their initial 20 innings, rather than having predominantly low or high scores (though Bradman and Labuschagne were heavily represented with big centuries).

Details for (a?) and (b) are given in Table 2 below.

Improvement is, in gener??al, to be expected with increasing experience/learning (barring injury, etc).

As far as th??is evidence takes us, it suggests that averages for those with around 20-30 innings can generally be taken as ??representative of ability at that stage of their careers, though there will likely be some individual exceptions. 

2. Importance of Attaining “Stature�?/strong> 

So I turned to another potential reason?? for reservations about the revised?? ranking table �?lack of attained stature in the game. I now suspect this is the chief reason.

“Stature�?is attained or bestowed by career length (years played), or more usually by a sizeable accumulation of innings, for those with a distinctly healthy average. Forum participants like arguing largely about heavyweights, judging from the? Player Comparisons thread. 

One could give a graduated weighting for this factor, though no participant explicitly advocated this. Instead, I’ve gone for a cut-off rule. What is to count as a sufficient number of innings is debatable, but I’ve chosen 50 innings as reasonable for post-WW1 players, and 25 innings for previous times to reflect a far lo?wer frequency of Tests and the calibre of who this captures.

Upshot: 32 of the 171 players have less than the specified number of innings – ie 19% of the total. These would all be excluded on this basis and are identified by underlining their names in Table 1. 

On?ly 2 of these 32 are wholly or predominantly pre-WW1 players (15 in total). 

Reflection: 6 of these 32 players include widely recognised Greats of the game: Graeme Pollock, Barry Richards, Sid Barnes, KS Duleepsinhji, Vijay Merchant and George Headley. I presume (without actual knowledge) that all, or most, participants would want to retain them as valid exceptions. If this is so, I’ve shown the resulting 145 players and? the top 25 averages in the table and graph below:

					Dominance	Average –	Allow for	STANDARDISED
		Career	Raw	Dead Runs	Rating	2000-23	Advance in	“EGALITARIAN”	Difference
Ranking		Span	Average	%	(ex Dead Runs)	Context	Expertise	AVERAGE	with Bradman
1	B Richards  (SA)	1970	72.57	nil	3.19	69.42	-2.5%	67.65	1.0%
2	D G Bradman  (Aus)	1928-48	99.94	8.9	3.24	70.08	-4.5%	66.96
3	S Smith  (Aus)	2010-23	58.94	0.6	2.37	58.59	nil	58.59	-12.5%
4	K Sangakkara  (SL)	2000-15	57.40	2.5	2.17	55.97	nil	55.97	-16.4%
5	G Pollock  (SA)	1963-70	60.97	1.3	2.16	55.77	-3.4%	53.87	-19.5%
6	K Williamson  (NZ)	2010-23	54.89	2.5	1.99	53.52	nil	53.52	-20.1%
7	J Kallis  (SA)	1995-2013	55.37	2.1	2.00	53.65	-0.3%	53.51	-20.1%
8	M Labuschagne (Aus)	2018-23	53.80	1.8	1.94	52.83	nil	52.83	-21.1%
9	S Barnes  (Aus)	1938-48	63.05	3.1	2.10	54.98	-5.0%	52.21	-22.0%
10	S Tendulkar  (Ind)	1989-2013	53.78	1.0	1.89	52.19	-0.5%	51.95	-22.4%
11	Younis Khan  (Pak)	2000-17	52.05	0.7	1.85	51.68	nil	51.68	-22.8%
12	K Barrington  (Eng)	1955-68	58.67	nil	1.99	53.52	-3.8%	51.48	-23.1%
13	R Dravid  (Ind)	1996-2012	52.31	0.6	1.83	51.40	-0.3%	51.26	-23.4%
14	G Sobers  (WI)	1954-74	57.78	0.7	1.95	52.99	-3.6%	51.06	-23.7%
15	M Yousuf  (Pak)	1998-2010	52.29	1.3	1.81	51.13	-0.2%	51.05	-23.8%
16	R Ponting  (Aus)	1995-2012	51.85	0.2	1.81	51.13	-0.3%	50.97	-23.9%
17	B Lara  (WI)	1990-2006	52.88	1.0	1.79	50.87	-0.6%	50.54	-24.5%
18	E Weekes  (WI)	1948-58	58.61	nil	1.95	52.99	-4.8%	50.46	-24.6%
19=	J Hobbs  (Eng)	1908-30	56.94	nil	2.01	53.78	-6.6%	50.25	-25.0%
	FS Jackson  (Eng)	1893-1905	48.79	nil	2.02	53.92	-6.8%	50.25	-25.0%
21	M Hussey  (Aus)	2005-13	51.52	2.6	1.74	50.16	nil	50.16	-25.1%
22	M Hayden  (Aus)	1994-2008	50.73	1.2	1.72	49.94	-0.4%	49.72	-25.7%
23	J Root  (Eng)	2012-23	50.16	0.9	1.70	49.71	nil	49.71	-25.8%
24	G Chappell  (Aus)	1970-84	53.86	1.3	1.82	51.27	-3.1%	49.66	-25.8%
25	AB de Villiers  (SA)	2004-18	50.66	2.5	1.68	49.39	nil	49.39	-26.2%
26	V Sehwag (Ind)	2001-13	49.34	nil	1.67	49.34	nil	49.34	-26.3%
27	J Miandad  (Pak)	1976-93	52.57	0.6	1.76	50.47	-2.4%	49.28	-26.4%
28	A Flower  (Zim)	1992-2002	51.54	nil	1.70	49.68	-0.8%	49.27	-26.4%
29	S Chanderpaul  (WI)	1994-2015	50.93	0.8	1.68	49.41	-0.3%	49.26	-26.4%
30	G Headley  (WI)	1930-39	66.72	nil	1.89	52.19	-6.0%	49.07	-26.7%
31	B Azam (Pak)	2016-23	48.63	nil	1.62	48.63	nil	48.63	-27.4%
32	M Jayawardene  (SL)	1997-2014	49.84	1.5	1.62	48.62	-0.2%	48.53	-27.5%
33	M Clarke  (Aus)	2004-15	49.10	1.3	1.61	48.47	nil	48.47	-27.6%
34	T Samaraweera  (SL)	2001-13	48.76	0.7	1.60	48.40	nil	48.40	-27.7%
35	C Walcott  (WI)	1948-60	56.58	1.6	1.77	50.60	-4.8%	48.16	-28.1%
36	S Waugh  (Aus)	1985-2004	51.06	0.5	1.61	48.48	-1.2%	47.90	-28.5%
37	S Gavaskar  (Ind)	1971-87	51.12	nil	1.68	49.41	-3.1%	47.89	-28.5%
38	G Smith  (SA)	2002-14	48.25	0.9	1.56	47.83	nil	47.83	-28.6%
39	V Kohli  (Ind)	2011-23	48.72	1.9	1.56	47.79	nil	47.79	-28.6%
40	Inzamam-ul-Haq  (Pak)	1992-2007	49.60	0.7	1.57	47.95	-0.6%	47.68	-28.8%
41	A Border  (Aus)	1978-94	50.56	0.3	1.62	48.62	-2.5%	47.42	-29.2%
42	U Khawaja (Aus)	2011-23	47.68	1.4	1.50	47.00	nil	47.00	-29.8%
43	V Richards  (WI)	1974-91	50.23	0.9	1.59	48.22	-2.8%	46.89	-30.0%
44	L Hutton  (Eng)	1937-55	56.67	1.4	1.70	49.68	-5.6%	46.88	-30.0%
45	A Gilchrist  (Aus)	1999-2008	47.60	1.4	1.48	46.76	-0.1%	46.71	-30.2%
46	A Shrewsbury  (Eng)	1882-93	35.47	nil	1.78	50.74	-8.0%	46.66	-30.3%
47	Misbah-ul-Haq  (Pak)	2001-17	46.62	nil	1.47	46.62	nil	46.62	-30.4%
48	K Pietersen  (Eng)	2005-14	47.28	1.7	1.46	46.47	nil	46.47	-30.6%
49	D Martyn  (Aus)	1992-2006	46.37	nil	1.43	46.10	-0.1%	46.04	-31.2%
50	KS Ranjitsinhji  (Eng)	1896-1902	44.95	nil	1.68	49.41	-7.4%	45.74	-31.7%
51	H Amla  (SA)	2004-19	46.64	2.0	1.40	45.71	nil	45.71	-31.7%
52	T Head (Aus)	2018-23	46.80	2.5	1.39	45.63	nil	45.63	-31.9%
53	R Sharma (Ind)	2013-23	45.22	nil	1.36	45.22	nil	45.22	-32.5%
54=	VVS Laxman  (Ind)	1996-2012	45.97	0.9	1.36	45.17	-0.3%	45.03	-32.7%
	S Katich  (Aus)	2001-10	45.03	nil	1.35	45.03	nil	45.03	-32.8%
56	A Cook  (Eng)	2006-18	45.35	0.9	1.34	44.95	nil	44.95	-32.9%
57	WG Grace (Eng)	1880-93	36.54	nil	1.65	49.01	-8.3%	44.94	-32.9%
58	M Richardson  (NZ)	2000-04	44.77	nil	1.33	44.77	nil	44.77	-33.1%
59	G Kirsten  (SA)	1993-2004	47.25	1.5	1.34	44.91	-0.7%	44.58	-33.4%
60	R Taylor (NZ)	2007-22	44.66	0.5	1.30	44.44	nil	44.44	-33.6%
61	H Sutcliffe  (Eng)	1924-35	60.73	nil	1.55	47.69	-6.8%	44.43	-33.6%
62	A Mathews  (SL)	2009-23	44.93	1.4	1.29	44.30	nil	44.30	-33.8%
63	D Warner  (Aus)	2011-23	44.61	1.0	1.28	44.16	nil	44.16	-34.0%
64	J Langer (Aus)	1993-2007	45.27	0.5	1.29	44.24	-0.6%	44.00	-34.3%
65	KD Walters  (Aus)	1965-81	48.26	0.6	1.40	45.70	-3.8%	43.96	-34.3%
66	JF Reid  (NZ)	1979-86	46.28	nil	1.36	45.17	-2.9%	43.87	-34.5%
67	D Jones  (Aus)	1984-92	46.65	nil	1.33	44.77	-2.2%	43.77	-34.6%
68	C Pujara  (Ind)	2010-23	43.60	nil	1.24	43.60	nil	43.60	-34.9%
69	G Boycott  (Eng)	1964-82	47.72	nil	1.37	45.30	-3.8%	43.59	-34.9%
70	CP Mead  (Eng)	1911-28	49.37	nil	1.50	47.03	-7.5%	43.50	-35.0%
71	R Pant (Ind)	2018-22	43.67	0.6	1.23	43.41	nil	43.41	-35.2%
72	D Nourse  (SA)	1935-51	53.81	nil	1.44	46.23	-6.3%	43.30	-35.3%
73	J Trott  (Eng)	2009-15	44.08	2.2	1.20	43.11	nil	43.11	-35.6%
74	C Lloyd  (WI)	1966-85	46.67	0.5	1.32	44.64	-3.6%	43.04	-35.7%
75	M Trescothick  (Eng)	2000-06	43.79	2.0	1.19	42.91	nil	42.91	-35.9%
76	KS Duleepsinhji  (Eng)	1929-31	58.52	nil	1.43	46.10	-6.9%	42.89	-35.9%
77	W Hammond  (Eng)	1927-47	58.45	1.8	1.42	45.97	-6.8%	42.84	-36.0%
78	G Thorpe  (Eng)	1993-2005	44.66	0.9	1.19	42.92	-0.7%	42.62	-36.4%
79	Saeed Anwar  (Pak)	1990-2001	45.52	nil	1.20	43.05	-1.1%	42.59	-36.4%
80	S Nurse  (WI)	1960-69	46.60	nil	1.30	44.38	-4.4%	42.42	-36.6%
81	R Kanhai  (WI)	1957-74	47.53	0.5	1.26	43.85	-3.4%	42.35	-36.8%
82	D Amiss  (Eng)	1966-77	46.30	nil	1.28	44.11	-4.1%	42.32	-36.8%
83	C Gayle  (WI)	2000-14	42.18	nil	1.13	42.18	nil	42.18	-37.0%
84	F Worrell  (WI)	1948-63	49.48	1.2	1.31	44.51	-5.4%	42.12	-37.1%
85	M Azharuddin  (Ind)	1985-2000	45.03	2.1	1.18	42.79	-1.7%	42.05	-37.2%
86	D Boon  (Aus)	1984-96	43.65	nil	1.19	42.92	-2.1%	42.02	-37.2%
87	D Compton  (Eng)	1937-57	50.06	1.0	1.33	44.77	-6.2%	41.98	-37.3%
88	W Lawry  (Aus)	1961-71	47.15	nil	1.26	43.85	-4.4%	41.92	-37.4%
89	Azhar Ali  (Pak)	2010-22	42.26	1.2	1.10	41.75	nil	41.75	-37.6%
90	ER Dexter  (Eng)	1958-68	47.89	nil	1.25	43.71	-4.5%	41.73	-37.7%
91	G Greenidge  (WI)	1974-91	44.72	0.4	1.20	43.05	-3.1%	41.72	-37.7%
92	I Bell  (Eng)	2004-15	42.69	2.4	1.10	41.67	nil	41.67	-37.8%
93	A Prince  (SA)	2002-11	41.64	nil	1.09	41.64	nil	41.64	-37.8%
94	M Crowe  (NZ)	1982-95	45.36	2.2	1.16	42.52	-2.2%	41.60	-37.9%
95	D Cullinan  (SA)	1993-2001	44.21	1.0	1.12	41.99	-1.0%	41.56	-37.9%
96	G Gambhir  (India)	2004-16	41.95	1.0	1.09	41.53	nil	41.53	-38.0%
97	R Richardson  (WI)	1983-95	44.39	nil	1.15	42.39	-2.1%	41.49	-38.0%
98	W Murdoch  (Aus)	1877-92	31.31	nil	1.38	45.44	-9.0%	41.36	-38.2%
99	D Gower  (Eng)	1978-92	44.25	0.6	1.16	42.52	-2.7%	41.35	-38.2%
100	M Vaughan (Eng)	1999-2008	41.44	nil	1.07	41.33	-0.1%	41.27	-38.4%
101	Zaheer Abbas (Pak)	1969-85	44.79	0.5	1.19	42.92	-3.9%	41.26	-38.4%
102=	R Simpson  (Aus)	1957-78	46.81	nil	1.21	43.18	-4.5%	41.23	-38.4%
	Shoaib Mohammad  (Pak)	1983-95	44.34	1.8	1.13	42.12	-2.1%	41.23	-38.4%
104	S Ganguly  (India)	1996-2008	42.17	0.4	1.07	41.33	-0.4%	41.16	-38.5%
105	H Gibbs  (SA)	1996-2008	41.95	0.6	1.07	41.33	-0.4%	41.16	-38.5%
106	N Harvey  (Aus)	1948-63	48.41	1.7	1.22	43.32	-5.5%	40.95	-38.8%
107	G Turner  (NZ)	1969-83	44.64	nil	1.16	42.52	-3.8%	40.89	-38.9%
108	A Kallicharran  (WI)	1972-81	44.43	nil	1.16	42.52	-3.9%	40.86	-39.0%
109	T Latham (NZ)	2014-23	41.53	1.9	1.03	40.74	nil	40.74	-39.2%
110	Saleem Malik (Pak)	1982-99	43.69	0.7	1.08	41.46	-2.0%	40.62	-39.3%
111	S Dhawan (Ind)	2013-18	40.61	nil	1.02	40.61	nil	40.61	-39.4%
112	V Hazare  (Ind)	1946-53	47.65	nil	1.22	43.32	-6.3%	40.60	-39.4%
113	R Smith  (Eng)	1988-96	43.67	nil	1.05	41.06	-1.7%	40.36	-39.7%
114	AH Jones  (NZ)	1987-95	44.27	1.9	1.05	41.06	-1.9%	40.30	-39.8%
115	Aravinda de Silva  (SL)	1984-2002	42.97	0.5	1.04	40.93	-1.7%	40.25	-39.9%
116	A Faulkner  (SA)	1906-24	40.79	nil	1.26	43.85	-8.3%	40.21	-40.0%
117	M Taylor  (Aus)	1989-99	43.49	nil	1.03	40.80	-1.5%	40.20	-40.0%
118	E Barlow (SA)	1961-70	45.74	nil	1.13	42.12	-4.6%	40.19	-40.0%
119	M Slater  (Aus)	1993-2001	42.83	0.3	1.01	40.53	-1.1%	40.10	-40.1%
120	PBH May (Eng)	1951-61	46.77	0.8	1.14	42.26	-5.6%	39.89	-40.4%
121	D Haynes  (WI)	1978-94	42.29	nil	1.02	40.67	-2.7%	39.58	-40.9%
122	M Amarnath  (India)	1969-88	42.50	nil	1.05	41.06	-3.7%	39.54	-40.9%
123	P McDonnell  (Aus)	1880-88	29.93	nil	1.24	43.58	-9.3%	39.51	-41.0%
124	D Vengsarkar  (India)	1976-92	42.13	nil	1.02	40.67	-3.0%	39.44	-41.1%
125	N O’Neill  (Aus)	1958-65	45.55	nil	1.08	41.46	-4.9%	39.42	-41.1%
126=	H Tillakaratne  (SL)	1989-2004	41.70	nil	0.95	39.74	-1.0%	39.34	-41.2%
	G Gooch  (Eng)	1975-95	42.58	0.9	1.00	40.40	-2.6%	39.34	-41.2%
128	A Morris  (Aus)	1946-55	46.48	0.8	1.12	41.99	-6.5%	39.28	-41.3%
129	C Hunte  (WI)	1958-67	45.06	nil	1.05	41.06	-4.9%	39.05	-41.7%
130	I Redpath  (Aus)	1964-76	43.45	0.6	1.03	40.80	-4.5%	38.98	-41.8%
131	L Hassett  (Aus)	1938-53	46.56	1.6	1.10	41.73	-6.6%	38.96	-41.8%
132	C Hill  (Aus)	1896-1912	39.21	nil	1.16	42.52	-8.7%	38.83	-42.0%
133	R Fredericks  (WI)	1968-77	42.49	nil	1.01	40.53	-4.4%	38.77	-42.1%
134	T Graveney  (Eng)	1951-69	44.38	nil	1.04	40.93	-5.3%	38.76	-42.1%
135	J Edrich  (Eng)	1963-76	43.54	1.4	1.01	40.53	-4.6%	38.69	-42.2%
136	I Chappell  (Aus)	1964-80	42.42	0.7	1.00	40.40	-4.4%	38.61	-42.3%
137	V Trumper  (Aus)	1899-1912	39.04	nil	1.14	42.26	-8.7%	38.59	-42.4%
138	C Cowdrey  (Eng)	1954-75	44.06	0.3	1.01	40.53	-5.0%	38.52	-42.5%
139	Hanif Mohammad (Pak)	1952-69	43.98	nil	1.00	40.40	-5.3%	38.26	-42.9%
140	C Macartney  (Aus)	1907-26	41.78	nil	1.05	41.06	-8.7%	37.51	-44.0%
141	V Merchant  (Ind)	1933-51	47.72	nil	1.00	40.40	-7.3%	37.47	-44.0%
142	B Mitchell  (SA)	1929-49	48.88	nil	1.00	40.40	-7.5%	37.36	-44.2%
143	V Ransford  (Aus)	1907-12	37.84	nil	1.03	40.80	-9.1%	37.11	-44.6%
144	W Bates  (Eng)	1882-87	27.33	nil	1.04	40.93	-9.9%	36.86	-45.0%
145	G Gunn  (Eng)	1907-30	40.00	nil	1.00	40.40	-8.9%	36.82	-45.0%

What to do About any Remaining Oddities?

Finally, for those who might find the rankings of Table 3 broadly satisfactory, what should be done i??n respect of any oddities �?ie players considered to be well out of their warranted position?

In my view, it is far better to identify reasons and alter the standardising model to suit than to try an ad hoc repositioning of a particular player, as the “reasons�?are likely?? to relate to some other players also. Eg to take account of reduced performa??nce after a major break due to injury/illness or whatever. That’s the scientific approach: keep iterating until the model applied gives sufficiently acceptable results.

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